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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The illicit proliferation, excessive accumulation and misuse of arms and ammunition 
pose a persistent challenge for peace and security at the global, regional and national 
levels. States suffering from extremely high levels of organized armed violence 
and those in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings are often disproportionately 
burdened by the illicit flow and availability of arms and ammunition, which impedes 
their efforts to provide security to their populations, respond to humanitarian needs, 
and to create an environment conducive to sustainable development. Furthermore, 
poor ammunition safety management poses a significant hazard to personnel 
and has been assessed as a contributory factor in many catastrophic unplanned 
explosions at munitions sites (UEMS).
The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) provide comprehensive 
and practical guidance on ammunition stockpile management. They incorporate 
three-ascending risk reduction process levels (RRPLs) to consider the realities 
and capacities in different contexts. This document provides practical advice and 
guidance on the implementation of safe and secure ammunition management 
practices in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments and in doing so it 
extracts essential elements from the IATG for guidance and information.
It covers :
• The context and need for improving ammunition management in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments ;
• Guidance on how to improve safety at ammunition storage sites by reducing the 
risk of an accidental explosion and by mitigating the effects of an explosion, 
should it occur ;
• Advice on implementing effective security measures to prevent stock diversion ;
• Advice on how the problem of unclassified ammunition should be addressed ;
• Guidance on the development of specific ammunition management competences 
and the training and development of personnel involved in ammunition management- 
related activities ;
• Identification of problematic areas where the international community can assist 
states in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments ;
This document is intended for use by :
• Government officials and policy makers
• Ammunition practitioners and those involved in the day-to-day management 
and operation of ammunition storage and processing facilities
• Staff of international entities and non-governmental organizations in the context 
of delivering ammunition safety enhancement projects.
This document offers practical information and guidance on how basic ammunition 
stockpile safety and security can be improved and risks reduced in ammunition 
storage and processing facilities with a view to more comprehensively utilizing 
the IATG in the longer term.
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Terms and definitions
This document does not provide a comprehensive glossary of terms and definitions. 
A comprehensive list of terms and definitions is available in the International 
Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG 01.40 Glossary of terms, definitions and 
abbreviations) available at www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition.
Referencing to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
This document references the IATG throughout. Furthermore, Annex I enumerates 
all the IATG modules referenced in each section including the web source link to 
every module. Moreover, specific mentions are made in sections of this document 
that contain guidance additional to the IATG based on good practices (as defined 
by ammunition technical experts).
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The illicit proliferation, excessive accumulation and misuse of arms and ammunition 
pose a persistent challenge for peace and security at the global, regional and national 
levels. The diversion of arms and ammunition – often occurring as a result of transfers 
without proper controls, unauthorized retransfers or leakages/thefts from poorly 
secured stockpiles – enables armed rebels, gangs, criminal organizations, pirates, 
terrorist groups and other unauthorized users to exponentially bolster their power. 
States suffering from extremely high levels of organised armed violence and those in 
conflict-affected and post-conflict settings are often disproportionately burdened by 
the illicit flow and availability of arms and ammunition, which impedes their efforts to 
provide both security and safety to their populations, respond to humanitarian needs, 
and to create an environment conducive to sustainable development.
Figure 1 – An Example of Poor Ammunition Management in West Africa. 1)
Inadequate ammunition management poses a significant safety hazard to personnel, 
both within a storage facility and external to it. Figure 1 shows a real example of 
weapons and a variety of munitions kept carelessly in a shipping container adjacent 
to a populated area in West Africa. Poor ammunition safety management has been 
assessed as a contributory factor in a significant number of catastrophic unplanned 
explosions at munitions sites (UEMS). The chart at Figure 2 shows the number of 
recorded UEMS in the period up to February 2018.
| 12
01
 —
 I
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n
Figure 2 – Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites. 2)
While the cost of a UEMS in terms of loss of life and injuries is relatively simple to 
measure, the financial costs may also be extremely high. In February 2009 a 
substantial quantity of military propellant was intercepted by the US Navy on the 
Russia-owned, Cypriot-flagged MV Monchegorsk in the Red Sea, while in transit 
from Islamic Republic of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic. A total of 98 shipping 
containers were seized and they were later stored in un-covered storage, with 
direct exposure to solar radiation, at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus. 
The storage location was adjacent to the island’s principal electricity generating 
station. On 11 July 2011, the contents of one of the containers ignited spontaneously 
and subsequently the entire stockpile detonated. Later analysis by the NATO 
Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC) estimated that the net 
explosive content of the stockpile was approximately 480,000 kg. 3) The incident 
resulted in 13 fatalities, 62 injuries and over 3 billion Euro of infrastructure damage. 
The former Cypriot Defence Minister was also later convicted of manslaughter.
While this document focuses on ammunition safety management, it is important 
to consider that civil explosives may also be stored in government operated and 
managed ammunition storage facilities. Commercial explosives, particularly those 
associated with the quarrying and other resource extraction industries, may often 
have much shorter safe shelf lives than military ammunition natures 4) and may also 
be packed in less robust packaging.
In addition to the safety threat posed by ammunition, there is a security dimension 
related to ammunition management. Inadequately regulated arms and ammunition 
are key enablers of armed conflict and high levels of organized armed violence and 
a means of sustaining it. As the UN Secretary General has emphasized : “Armed 
violence erodes legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms and undermines 
the rule of law. Easily available and uncontrolled arms and ammunition threaten 
political processes, undermine police and military authority, and deeply harm security 
sector processes” 5) Armed conflict and high levels of armed violence represent 
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a grave impediment to economic growth and is one of the leading reasons that 
businesses decide not to invest in a country. There is a common denominator in 
these trends – that progress on virtually all security and development goals are 
severely hampered in areas where arms and ammunition are poorly regulated. 
Thus, weapons and ammunition management (WAM) has become crucial in the 
work of the United Nations (UN) in conflict-affected and post-conflict environments.
Diversion of ammunition may take place for a number of reasons including 6) :
• Battlefield capture ;
• Leakage due to ineffective physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) ;
• State sponsored diversion ; or
• Loss following state collapse.
In addition, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become the weapon of choice 
of any insurgent and terrorist groups and the ready availability of military munitions 
has acted as an accelerant for IED proliferation. Recent conflicts in Iraq, Libya and 
Syrian Arab Republic have demonstrated how a lack of security and control of military 
ammunition stockpiles can fuel insurgencies and terrorist campaigns based on the use 
of the IED. Indeed, the warheads and explosive contents of military munitions that are 
diverted, are perfect for inclusion in the main charges as IEDs as they are optimized to 
produce anti-personnel or anti-infrastructure effects and are thus extremely damaging 
when employed against non-hardened or other unprotected targets.
Figure 3 shows the aftermath of a massive suicide vehicle-borne IED used to 
attack the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, on 19 August 2003. The IED was 
manufactured using military high explosive (HE) filled munitions that had been 
looted from an Iraqi Army ammunition storage area (ASA). The attack resulted 
in the deaths of at least 22 people, including Sérgio Viera de Mello, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq.
Figure 3 – Aftermath of the Bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. 7)
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2.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document is first and foremost designed to assist those individuals and 
organisations operating in conflict-affected and resource-constrained settings.
This document offers practical advice and guidance on how basic ammunition 
stockpile safety and security can be immediately improved and the ways risks can 
be reduced in ammunition storage and processing facilities with a view to full application 
of the IATG in the longer term.
This document provides practical advice and guidance on the implementation of 
effective and safe ammunition management practices, based on the IATG, in conflict- 
affected (CA) and low-capacity (LC) environments. It provides the following :
• The context and need for improving ammunition management in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments ;
• Guidance on how to improve safety at ammunition sites by reducing the risk of an 
accidental explosion and mitigating the effects of an explosion, should it occur ;
• Advice on implementing effective security measures to prevent stock diversion ;
• Advice on how the problem of unclassified 8) ammunition should be addressed ;
• Guidance on the development of specific ammunition management compe-
tences and the training and development of personnel involved in ammunition 
management and other ammunition-related activities ;
• Identification of potential areas where the International Community can assist 
states in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments ;
2.2 AUDIENCE OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document is intended for use by :
• Government officials and policy makers to influence those who have control 
over the allocation of resources and those who may be involved in the development 
of national policies and legislation relating to the management of explosives and 
ammunition.
• Ammunition practitioners, including managers and technical officers who are 
involved in the day-to-day management and operation of ammunition storage 
and processing facilities ;
• Staff of both international and non-government organisations and other entities 
involved in the delivery of national capacity development projects relating to 
ammunition management. It is also relevant to those involved with implementation 
of regional initiatives and national capability enhancement measures.
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The document does not seek to replace or supplant the IATG. It signposts the reader 
to the relevant section of the IATG, and other external resources, where more 
underpinning information is required. Ammunition management is always a potential 
hazardous activity, and unauthorized and unqualified staff should not handle and/or 
manage ammunition at any time.
2.3 STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document is structured so that each section stands on its own merits. The core 
sections of the document are organized as follows :
• Section 3 – Context provides an overview of the subject and describes what 
is different for ammunition management in conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments to better founded and resourced settings ;
• Section 4 - Improving Safety – Reducing the Risk of Accidental Explosions 
examines those measures which may be taken to reduce the risk of accidental 
explosion occurring ;
• Section 5 - Improving Safety – Mitigating and Managing the Effects of Accidental 
Explosions examines those measures which may be taken to reduce the effects 
and impact of an accidental explosion should it occur ;
• Section 6 – Developing Ammunition Storage Infrastructure for Conflict-Affected 
and Low-Capacity Environments examines expedient methods which may be 
employed for the development of ammunition storage and processing infrastructure. 
This section contains guidance additional to the IATG based on good practices 
on the ground ;
• Section 7 - Implementing Effective Security Measures and Preventing Stock 
Diversion examines methods which may be implemented in resource constrained 
environments and where conflict places particular demands on security forces ;
• Section 8 - Managing Unclassified Ammunition provides advice and guidance 
on how the intractable problem of unclassified ammunition could be addressed. 
This section contains guidance additional to the IATG based on good practices 
on the ground ;
• Section 9 - Training and Competence Development examines the basic ammu-
nition management and technical competencies required for safe operation of 
ammunition storage and processing facilities ;
• Section 10 - Engagement with International Stakeholders looks at areas where 
international stakeholders and donors can contribute to national capacity building 
in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments.
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2.4 METHODOLOGY
This document has been developed from the work conducted by an informal group 
of expert practitioners on weapons and ammunition management (WAM) during 
a UNIDIR-led series of meetings between June 2017 and September 2018. The 
expert meeting series was entitled “Exploring Technical Processes to Operationalize 
Essential Weapons and Ammunition Management Elements in Conflict-Affected 
Settings”. This document highlights critical aspects of the IATG, which are particularly 
relevant for conflict-affected and low-capacity environments. 9) Some of the material 
presented in this document is based on the practical experience of the informal 
group of expert practitioners. This document is subject to updates based on revisions 
of the IATG, related tools and support documents.
03
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3.1 THE IATG PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The IATG follow the philosophy of a safe, secure, effective and efficient conventional 
ammunition stockpile management system, which should be to ensure the implemen-
tation of certain minimum protection criteria for personnel and property, whilst 
maintaining effective security and control of ammunition and explosives.
The IATG are shaped by four guiding principles 10) and these apply equally to conflict- 
affected and low-capacity environments :
• National Responsibilities and Obligations. National governments hold the 
primary responsibility to develop and apply national standards to their national 
stockpile. This should normally be vested in an authority, which is responsible 
for the development and enforcement of national legislation and regulations 
and oversees the coordination and management of the state’s ammunition 
stockpile. In conflict-affected environments, where there is an absence of state 
control and authority, it may be necessary for international organizations, such 
as the UN, to implement ad hoc ammunition management practices normally 
in accordance with the principles enshrined in the IATG.
• Explosives Safety. Explosives safety is paramount and this includes the need 
to protect those most at risk from undesirable explosive events, such as local 
civilian communities and explosives workers. The IATG contains risk management 
guidance on how the risks of an unplanned explosion at an ammunition storage 
site could be reduced, as well as measures to mitigate the hazard to those 
beyond the perimeter of a storage facility. Duty of care requires the risk of any 
hazard being realised shall be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
• Capacity Building. Many states possess only a limited capacity to manage ammuni-
tion effectively, safely, and securely in their national stockpile. A key element of the 
IATG is the requirement to build up the national capacity to develop, maintain and 
apply appropriate standards in order to support well-adapted stockpile management. 
In this context, capacity building is concerned with assisting states to develop 
national capabilities to : reduce and dispose of excess or unnecessary stocks ; develop 
safe systems of storage for existing and retained stockpiles ; and to improve the 
overall safety and effectiveness of ammunition stockpile management.
• Adherence with International Regulations and Guidelines. The IATG have been 
developed to maintain consistency and adherence with other international norms, 
conventions and agreements. 11)
Each national regulatory context is unique. The IATG are not meant to be a blue print 
to be replicated in every country at the national level, regardless of the circumstances. 
Rather, they provide the authoritative, tested underpinning principles and guidance 
on which sound national policy, regulations and technical operating procedures 
may be based.
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3.2  WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING THE IATG IN  
CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND LOW-CAPACITY ENVIRONMENTS ?
Ammunition management in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments may 
be characterised by one, and usually more, of the following :
Regulatory Issues
• There can be a limited national legislative or regulatory framework covering the 
storage, transport and processing of ammunition ;
• Proper accounting of stock may not be taking place and surplus ammunition 
not defined. Surplus stock may be seen as an asset, rather than a liability, and 
insufficient emphasis is placed on the disposal of surplus and unserviceable 
ammunition ;
• There may be insufficient national guidelines and legislation governing the 
transport of dangerous goods, including ammunition and explosives ;
• There may be limited technical or standard operating procedures governing the 
processing and storage of military munitions ;
• There may be insufficiently rigorous procedures in place to assure the safety 
and security of ammunition stockpiles and there may be a significant risk of illicit 
diversion, fuelling national and regional instability ;
• Basic procedures for ammunition safety management, such as : risk assessments, 
fire-fighting, emergency rescue plans, and safety drills may have not been 
developed, implemented or tested.
Resources
• Resources may be constrained and there may be insufficient national funds to 
cover capital and operating cost expenditure on ammunition management systems ;
• Ammunition may not be systematically procured for associated weapon systems 
in amounts relative to use, shelf-life, storage capacity etc. There can even be a 
disconnect between ammunition stored and weapons which are in service i.e. 
ammunition may be stored for which the state no longer has any compatible 
weapon in service.
Technical
• The safety and security risks associated with ammunition storage, transport and 
processing might be generally not well understood. Furthermore, the risks may 
not be communicated to senior managers and ministers and those in governments 
who should either accept or take steps to mitigate the risk ;
• Hazard classification data (hazard division and compatibility group) may be missing 
from the markings on ammunition packages. The ammunition may not have 
been subjected to hazard classification testing and certification by a competent 
national authority 12) ;
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• The condition of ammunition stocks may be unclear, and no surveillance or 
inspection regime is in place. Ammunition may be unpackaged, badly packaged, 
or inadequately marked ;
• There may be few, or no, technical measures implemented to reduce the hazard 
to stored ammunition by lightning or static electricity.
Security
• Access to ammunition sites may not be rigorously controlled and there may be 
a significant risk of both diversion of explosives, for example for use in IEDs, 
and sites may be vulnerable to sabotage ;
• Basic fire prevention measures may not be implemented, and insufficient vege-
tation control takes place during the most hazardous (dry) seasons. Contraband 
restrictions and non-smoking policies in ammunition facilities may not be in force.
Infrastructure
• The infrastructure associated with the storage and processing of ammunition 
can be rudimentary, and not fit for purpose ;
• Ammunition storage facilities can be located close to inhabited civilian dwellings 
and the concept of safeguarding 13) cannot be understood ;
• Ammunition facilities may be located close to critical national infrastructure, or 
other sources of hazard such as : toxic industrial chemicals, flammable gases and 
liquids ; all of which would exacerbate the effects of a UEMS.
Competences
• National personnel may lack the core competences required in ammunition 
management ;
• Training of ammunition personnel may be rudimentary or incomplete.
3.3 LOW-CAPACITY ENVIRONMENTS
The term ‘low-capacity’ covers a category of environment where for a variety of 
reasons ammunition management maturity may be at a relatively basic level. Often 
the key issue is one of a lack of resources or prioritization, but other issues may 
also have a significant impact.
Resources and Capital
A lack of resources and capital has a fundamental impact in determining the ‘art of 
the possible’ in low-capacity environments. In all States there is a requirement to 
balance investment in the state sector according to national priorities and needs. 
In low-capacity environments there are seldom sufficient resources for states to 
implement the guidelines and measures recommended in the IATG (even considering 
the IATG’s ascending risk reduction level process) and it is necessary for them 
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to apply their limited resources where they will have greatest effect. There is a 
significant role that the international community and donors can play in assisting 
states develop national ammunition management capabilities and this is covered 
in greater detail in Section 10.
Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks
A lack of a defined legislative and regulatory framework is a significant problem in 
developing effective ammunition management practices in low-capacity environments. 
Ensuring that national leaders, ministers and other senior stakeholders are aware 
of the hazards posed by poorly managed ammunition is important. All too often this 
knowledge is gained the hard way i.e. dealing with the aftermath of a catastrophic 
UEMS.
The development of national frameworks for ammunition management necessarily 
requires top-level support from government ministers. In circumstances where there 
is limited or no national legislation or regulation, it will also require the attention of 
those involved in the drafting of primary legislation. 14)
Issues of Numeracy and Literacy
Developing effective ammunition management personnel competencies is difficult 
when there is an absence of fundamental numeracy and literacy skills. Basic numeracy 
is a prerequisite for sound ammunition accounting and the ability to read is critical to 
understanding the markings on ammunition packages. For this reason, pictograms 
form an important safety element in the marking of ammunition packages and assist 
those with poor literacy skills in assessing the hazards associated with particular 
ammunition natures. Similarly, the use of fire division symbols on the approaches 
to explosive store-houses can assist fire fighters in evaluating the hazard posed by 
a fire in a storage location.
Technical Skills and Education
The more advanced aspects of ammunition management and regulatory oversight 
require a measure of engineering and technical knowledge which may not be present 
in some less developed states. 15) While it is tempting for donors to try and impose 
an advanced ammunition management system on recipient nations, it is important 
that a broad approach is taken to the development of personnel competences. 
Assistance in future manager and leader education programmes may be as important 
as implementing practical ammunition management projects on the ground.
The ability to construct and maintain ammunition storage and processing facilities is 
sometimes limited by lack of technical knowledge and the general civil engineering 
capabilities that are present within a low-capacity environment. Often, even basic 
civil engineering plant and equipment associated with simple earth moving and 
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construction is not readily available. Similarly, materials such as sand, cement and 
rebar may not be available in large enough quantities and/or quality to construct 
heavy walled buildings or structures with reinforced concrete roofs. Infrastructure 
projects which are possible to implement with simple tools and widely available 
local materials are most appropriate for low-capacity environments
Military Procurement Focus on Equipment
A challenge most Armed Forces face, not just those in low-capacity environments, is 
to focus on technical equipment matters without considering the broader capability 
integration issues associated with the acquisition of a particular weapon system. 
All too often this overriding focus on equipment results in a neglect of running 
costs, logistics, training and infrastructure considerations. Some complex weapon 
systems, such as air defence missile systems and maritime guided missiles, give 
rise to lifecycle management requirements e.g. storage costs and manpower for 
maintenance procedures within complex ammunition processing facilities. A coherent 
approach to the effective lifecycle management of ammunition is a prerequisite 
for the implementation of an effective ammunition safety management system. 16)
Arms exporting nations should exercise caution in transferring, either through sale 
or gift, complex weapon systems that require substantial supporting infrastructure, 
in particular to low-capacity environments. For some weapon systems, particularly 
those containing toxic items such as liquid propellants, the financial and environmental 
costs, and organizational capacity needed for subsequent disposal can be substantial. 
In addition, from an importing perspective, it is essential that a thorough analysis of 
through-life issues is undertaken before any complex weapon system is acquired.
3.4 CONFLICT-AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS
Characteristics of Conflict-Affected Environments
Conflict-affected environments often have some or all of the characteristics of the 
low-capacity environments described in the previous subsection but are further 
complicated by conflict. In this context, major combat operations may have ended 
but there may still be considerable security challenges posed by violent extremists 
or other non-state actors. In addition, conflict may have resulted in the loss of 
control of centralized state stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and these may 
have been looted. Inadequate ammunition management in one state may also 
have regional consequences. There are well documented examples of terrorist 
organisations or armed groups transferring ammunition across international borders 
and over considerable distances to meet their specific operational requirements. 17)
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Lack of Central or Local Government Control
A common feature in many conflict-affected environments is a lack of authority exerted 
by either central or local government. In the worst cases, on-going civil wars make 
the enforcement of national laws and regulations impossible. In situations where 
regional or UN peacekeeping operations are filling the governance vacuum, it is 
strongly recommended that best international practices, such as those described 
in the IATG, are followed for ammunition management. 18)
Problems of IED Proliferation
Recent conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syrian Arab Republic have demonstrated how 
a lack of security and control of military ammunition stockpiles can fuel insurgencies 
and campaigns of armed violence based on the use of the IED. 19) This was demon-
strated clearly in Iraq during the period 2003 to 2011 where violent extremist groups 
gained access to the former regime’s stockpile of military munitions. HE-filled 
shells, warheads and aircraft bombs formed the principal constituents of IED main 
charges during this period. Figure 4 shows a typical suicide-vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive device (SVBIED), which was intercepted by Libyan security force personnel 
and rendered safe in January 2018. It demonstrates clearly how military munitions, 
in this case large calibre HE artillery shells, may be re-purposed to form effective 
IED main charges.
Figure 4 – ISIL/Da’esh Suicide-vehicle-borne IED, Abugrein, Libya. 20)
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A well-documented lesson to be learned from Libya, Iraq and Syrian Arab Republic 
is that violent extremist groups are quick to exploit available sources of explosive 
and the IED is now the weapon of choice for many groups. Military munitions, 
such as aircraft bombs, HE shells and missile warheads, are usually included in 
IEDs as the main charges and they have an impact far greater than that of most 
homemade explosives. From a national security and cost-benefit perspective, it 
is far more effective to deal with surplus and unserviceable munitions while they 
are stored centrally and properly secured in an ammunition storage area (ASA) 
awaiting destruction, than to wait for them to be dispersed and then deal with 
them as individual IEDs.
3.5  OPERATIONAL CONTEXT RELEVANT TO APPLYING THE IATG IN  
HIGH-RISK AND LOW-CAPACITY SETTINGS
Gaining National Ownership and Buy-In
A critical success factor in implementing any effective ammunition safety management 
system is gaining buy-in and commitment from the highest levels of government. 
It is important that senior government ministers are made aware of the safety and 
security hazards posed by poorly stored or large stockpiles of unserviceable or 
surplus ammunition. In circumstances where military munitions are not stored in 
a manner consistent to the IATG then this resulting risk should be quantified and 
accepted by the appropriate authority. 21)
Applying the IATG
Governments applying the IATG will need to identify what should be done first and how 
their limited resources be employed to best effect to minimise risks to people.
The following sections in the document describe a number of discrete approaches 
that could be taken either sequentially or in parallel to reduce the hazards associated 
with ammunition storage and processing sites. Every situation is different, and it is 
recommended that a top-level risk assessment be conducted first before decisions 
are taken on how to employ scarce resources to best effect.
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Understanding the Technical Terms Used within the IATG
Ammunition management is a domain replete with complex technical terms and 
can be difficult to understand for those without formal training in the subject. It is 
essential that those involved in ammunition management take every opportunity 
to explain in simple terms why certain processes and approaches are required 
for dealing with ammunition, which are different to other military commodities or 
dangerous goods. The IATG contains a comprehensive guide to the technical terms 
associated with ammunition safety management. 22)
Lack of Competences in the Planning, Management and Operation 
of Safe Systems of Work in Ammunition Facilities
A lack of competences in the areas of planning, management and operation of safe 
systems of work in ammunition facilities imposes severe limitations on what can 
be achieved by states operating in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments. 
There is an onus on the International Community and donor states to ensure 
that where support is given to addressing ammunition management issues, due 
cognisance is given to the development of personnel competences. This is covered 
in greater detail in Section 10.
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This section provides an overview of the methods and approaches which could be 
employed to reduce the risk of an accidental explosion occurring within an ammunition 
storage or processing facility. A fundamental element of any effective ammunition 
safety management system is a coherent approach to the identification of hazards 
and the evaluation of risk. In all environments, time spent developing or refining a 
baseline risk assessment is seldom wasted as it contributes to a broader understanding 
of the specific risks associated with the operation of a particular site.
4.1  ASSESSING AND MANAGING RISK IN AMMUNITION STORAGE AND 
PROCESSING FACILITIES
Conduct of Risk Assessments
The IATG provides substantial guidance on how risk assessments should be con-
ducted. 23) In its most basic form, a simple risk assessment could look at individual 
processing and storage sites and make an estimate of the worst-case effects of 
an accident occurring. The IATG Implementation Support Toolkit provides useful 
software applications, which, with some training, may be used to predict worse case 
explosion effects. Risk assessments should be conducted by personnel who are 
trained and sufficiently experienced in ammunition or explosives safety management.
The ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) concept is widely used in ammunition 
management and it is an objective for states’ ammunition safety management 
systems which should be sought by national authorities. 24) In the early stages 
of implementing ammunition safety management principles and processes, it is 
recommended that those actions that have the greatest impact on improving safety 
are implemented first. Determining whether a particular process at an ASA, or 
ammunition processing facility, is ALARP usually requires some technical judgment 
and knowledge on the part of the person conducting the risk assessment. Such 
qualitative assessments may be significantly affected by the skill and experience of 
the person conducting the risk assessment hence they should be peer reviewed.
If a risk assessment is to provide meaningful and technically appropriate outputs, 
it is essential that the risk analysis exercise be conducted by an entity with suffi-
cient knowledge in ammunition safety management. Risk assessments should 
be conducted for individual ammunition holding and processing units. A top-level 
risk assessment may also identify existing system-wide vulnerabilities. These may 
also identify vulnerabilities in national accounting systems or the susceptibility of 
ammunition to be diverted for illicit purposes when it is being transported or used 
without adequate supervision, for example during training on live firing ranges.
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Should the risk assessment at a particular site indicate that there is a high probability 
of a potentially catastrophic UEMS then this must be immediately brought to the 
attention of the relevant authorities. In such a situation, the following additional actions 
should be initiated :
• The production of an Explosive Safety Case (ESC) 25) which details the likely 
consequences of a UEMS ;
• The development of an action plan to mitigate the risks identified in the risk 
assessment, which should also identify the outline level of resources required ;
• Acceptance by the senior responsible personnel that while the identified risks 
are not ALARP, they are acknowledged (in a form of a ‘Letter of Authority’ as 
established in the IATG). 26)
An Explosive Safety Case is an effective method for communicating the unmitigated risks 
associated with the operation of an ammunition storage or processing facility.  
It is essential that the ESC is generated by staff who possess the appropriate technical 
competences to identify potential hazards and to assess possible consequences and 
effects. The principal findings and recommendations of the ESC should be clear, concise 
and understood by those who are responsible for accepting the risk, normally senior 
military commanders or government ministers.
In conflict-affected environments where there is an absence of a recognised central 
or local government, and a regional or international peacekeeping contingent is in 
place, then the risk assessment could be conducted by appropriately qualified and 
experienced ammunition professionals within the deployed peacekeeping contingent 
and, if possible, with the participation of the local authorities.
Use of the IATG Implementation Support Toolkit 27)
The following tools of the IATG Implementation Support Toolkit are particularly useful 
in assessing risk and reducing the probability of an accidental explosion at a particular 
location. It is important that the limitations of each tool are understood and that 
they are used by an appropriately trained person. The tools are subject to periodic 
enhancement and updating. The use of these tools in conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments is strongly recommended. 28)
• Explosion Consequence Analysis. The Explosion Consequence Analysis tool  29) 
allows a user to determine the likely blast effects of the detonation of a specific 
quantity of explosives at varying distances. The tool allows an estimation of the 
distances at which specific injuries will occur to exposed personnel, distances 
at which glazing damage will be sustained, and the predicted level of damage to 
buildings constructed from brick and masonry. 30)
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• Quantity Distance Map. The Quantity-Distance Mapping Tool 31) uses a map-based 
graphical interface to display the radii within which for a given net quantity 
of explosive there should be restrictions on inhabited buildings, buildings of 
vulnerable construction, or public traffic routes. If buildings and public traffic routes 
already exist, this tool can be used iteratively to determine the Net Explosive 
Quantity (NEQ) of explosives that can be stored before an accident would 
adversely impact on an existing route or building. Figure 5 shows an example of 
typical results that may be obtained from using Quantity Distance tool.
Where non-explosive hazardous material is stored in proximity to explosive sites, 
such as toxic industrial chemicals, then it may be necessary to employ other tools 
to assess and evaluate the combined hazard. For example, WebWISER 32) is an 
internet-based application that is designed to assist emergency responders in 
hazardous material incidents.
Figure 5 – Example output from the Quantity-Distance tool.
• Risk Reduction Check List. Within the IATG, the tasks and activities necessary 
for safe, efficient and effective stockpile management equate to one of three risk 
reduction process levels (RRPLs). These are indicated within each IATG as being 
either LEVEL 1, LEVEL 2 or LEVEL 3, depending on the degree of complexity 
of each task or activity. The Risk Reduction Check List 33) tool provides a simple 
method to determine the RRPL for a particular stockpile.
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4.2 AMMUNITION HANDLING AND STORAGE MANAGEMENT
Ammunition Storage Planning 34)
Ammunition storage planning is the critical activity concerned with assigning am-
munition to individual storage locations. At the strategic level, prioritization should 
be given to the storage of operationally essential ammunition natures in storage 
locations which provide the required levels of physical and environmental protection.
At the individual ASA level, in considering whether it is appropriate to store an 
ammunition nature in a particular ESH, the following factors should be considered :
• The Net Explosive Quantity of the Explosive Storehouse and the current Net 
Explosive Quantity of ammunition natures stored in that location. Will the inclusion 
of additional ammunition exceed the maximum licensed Net Explosive Quantity 
permitted to be stored in that location ? 35)
• Is the ammunition compatible with the compatibility group of the ammunition 
already stored in the Explosive Storehouse ? 36)
• Does the ammunition nature contain materials which require segregated storage 
e.g. natures containing White Phosphorus or liquid propellants ?
• Does the ammunition nature require any specific equipment for safe storage ?
• Is the ammunition nature propulsive ? If it is, can it be stored such that it is 
orientated in a safe direction ?
Ammunition Storage Management 37)
At its most basic level the ammunition stockpile should be segregated such that 
serviceable and unserviceable munitions are not stored in the same physical ESH 
location. It is particularly important that hazardous ammunition, such as that within 
inadequate or badly damaged packaging, or containing shelf life expired propel-
lants, is not stored with other serviceable ammunition. In some circumstances 
the serviceability of ammunition may be a matter of perspective and technical 
judgment. Safety and serviceability may require the use of ammunition surveillance 
techniques. For example, the assessment of serviceability and safety of military 
propellants is almost impossible without the use of diagnostic chemical analytical 
techniques. Deciding whether ammunition is safe to store, move or use requires 
personnel with the requisite technical competences.
There is a fundamental difference between ammunition that is safe to store and 
ammunition that is safe to use. Many types of ammunition, particularly warheads, 
shell fillings based on melt cast compositions of TNT, and large diameter rocket 
grains may crack and degrade when subject to extreme temperatures in diurnal 
cycling. While such cracking does not pose a significant hazard in storage, it may 
result in catastrophic accidents if such ammunition natures are fired.
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It is essential that serviceable and unserviceable ammunition natures be segregated. 
Certain ammunition natures may deteriorate into an unsafe condition when they  
have exceeded their safe shelf life and these natures should be disposed of at the  
earliest opportunity.
Ammunition Accounting
A robust ammunition accounting system is fundamental to the effective management 
of ammunition. An ammunition accounting system does not have to be computer- 
based. Perfectly satisfactory manual accounting systems exist. In its most basic 
form, a robust ammunition accounting system must account for ammunition by type, 
quantity and location. It is impossible to conduct a meaningful risk assessment at 
an ASA unless the types and quantities of ammunition stored are known. 38)
When taken in conjunction with some basic technical information, such as the NEQ, 
hazard division and compatibility group of the ammunition nature, it is possible to 
draw some simple conclusions regarding the hazard posed by the ammunition in 
a particular storage location to other potential explosion sites (PES) i.e. other sites 
which may be processing and storing ammunition. It is also possible to determine 
the degree of hazard posed to external entities such as : inhabited and vulnerable 
buildings, public traffic routes and other locations.
While a basic assessment of risk can be conducted based on simple ammunition 
stock quantities, unless the technical condition of the ammunition is known, it is not 
possible to determine whether that ammunition is safe to transport and use. In 
conflict-affected and low-capacity environments it is recommended that a simple 
system of technical condition be employed, and that ammunition is assigned to one 
of the following categories :
• Ammunition is safe to store and transport and is serviceable and fit for issue and 
use in all conditions ;
• Ammunition is safe to store and transport but is unserviceable or shelf life has 
expired and requires disposal.
• Ammunition is unsafe and requires immediate destruction.
Fundamental elements of any effective ammunition accounting system are the need 
for an accurate inventory of the stockpile and its condition (e.g. serviceable, unser-
viceable or requiring disposal) and a robust approach to auditing. No effective safety 
or security related stockpile management decisions or actions can be taken if a state 
does not know what ammunition it has or the condition of that ammunition. Once 
the inventory is completed, then accurate accounting practices can be implemented. 
Independent and comprehensive auditing then become essential backstops against 
corruption and the prevention of diversion. A rigorous audit system includes a hierarchy 
of internal audits, external audits and regulatory oversight. As a practical matter, it 
is the independence of the auditors, a mechanism for corrective action, and recourse 
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to political oversight that will ensure an effective auditing system is established 
and maintained. In the end, an audit is meant for assurance, not insurance. Auditors 
only check the standards ; they do not design or implement them. Given the human, 
financial and political resource constraints on auditors, a government may need to 
design a system of controls and risk management to set the proper foundation for 
the auditors’ work.
4.3 AMMUNITION HANDLING, STACKING AND ESH MANAGEMENT
Ammunition Handling
Ammunition must always be handled with care. Rough handling, including dropping, 
must be avoided. Even seemingly robust items, such as artillery shells, can have 
the integrity of their HE fillings dangerously compromised by rough or incorrect 
handling. More delicate natures, such as thin-skinned items and those containing 
solid fuel rocket motors, liquid propellants, white phosphorous, or safety and arming 
mechanisms, may become unserviceable or unsafe for further storage if subjected 
to improper handling. The IATG provides further specific guidance on ammunition 
handling. 39) If mechanical handling equipment (MHE) is employed then operators will 
require appropriate training in its use. The safe storage of fuel and the maintenance 
of the MHE must also be considered. 40)
Ammunition Stack Management
Ammunition should be separated by nature 41) within the storehouse and by lot or 
batch if that is known. Palletized ammunition should not be stored against the walls 
of the store nor should it be stacked higher than the recommended maximum 
height. Stability of stacks is important and ammunition boxes and pallets should not 
be stacked above a designated safe height as collapsing stacks pose both a hazard 
to personnel and are a potential source of fire or accidental explosion. Figure 6 shows 
an example of an unsafe ammunition stack ; in this example the palletized 155 mm 
artillery shells are not designed to be stacked more than one pallet high.
Unpalletized ammunition should be stacked using pallets and dunnage. Stacks should 
be separated by gangways to facilitate personnel access and stocktaking actions. 
Gangways also permit airflow over the ammunition stack helping cool ammunition 
stocks during high ambient temperature storage conditions. Gangways also facilitate 
easy access to stock and facilitate accurate stocktaking and audit. It is essential 
that ammunition is not stored directly on the ground and that air flows underneath 
packages when possible. In hot-wet conditions, particularly in areas prone to 
flooding, ammunition pallets and wooden boxes will deteriorate quickly if stored 
on the ground. 42) Non-palletized, boxed ammunition may be stored on loose pallets, 
separate dunnage, or on racking.
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Figure 6 – Unsafe Ammunition Stacks at an Ammunition Storage Area in North Africa. 43)
Maintenance of Store Cleanliness
Explosive storehouses (ESHs) should be swept clean and be free from debris. It is 
particularly important that material which could pose a fire hazard is not permitted 
to accumulate. Explosive or propellant dusts and residues pose a significant hazard 
if they build up within ammunition processing areas. All areas should be swept clean 
at the end of each working day and explosive waste should be disposed of in a 
safe and authorised fashion. Only approved tools and equipment shall be present 
or used inside ESHs.
Only ammunition natures should be stored in ESHs. Non-explosive components and  
other parts of weapon systems should be stored in other suitable locations.
Storage of Propulsive Munitions
Ammunition natures containing their own means of propulsion, such as missiles and 
free flight rockets, should be orientated in storage such that the projection hazard 
presented in the event of an accidental initiation is reduced i.e. they should be 
orientated to point away from doors and towards substantial walls or barricade or 
away from populated areas (in the absence of intervening barricades). 44)
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Management of Empty Ammunition Boxes 45)
Empty ammunition boxes should be removed from the explosives area and stored 
in a designated area. If allowed to accumulate, empty wooden ammunition boxes 
pose a fire hazard. All hazard markings and labels should be removed from empty 
ammunition packaging.
Specialist Equipment
If ammunition that contains white phosphorous (WP) is stored, then appropriate 
specialist equipment to deal with leaks should be readily available. Similarly, am-
munition items containing liquid propellants may require specialist draining kits to 
deal with leakage. 46)
Movement of Non-Palletized Ammunition 47)
The movement of unpalletized ammunition is a personnel-intensive activity and 
requires heavy manual labour. As this activity is most often conducted by those 
with limited technical ammunition knowledge it is important that it is appropriately 
supervised in order to ensure that suitable care is exercised in the handling of 
ammunition.
4.4 CLIMATIC PROTECTION
Ammunition deteriorates quickly if stored in open conditions without protection 
from the weather. 48) In wet conditions, even robust natures, such as plugged artillery 
shell and aircraft bombs will corrode rapidly. Corrosion around fuze wells and driving 
bands may quickly render these natures unserviceable. In high-temperature climatic 
conditions, repeated diurnal temperature cycling may affect the integrity of explosive 
fillings and melt cast compositions based on TNT are particularly susceptible to 
damage. Condensation may also form inside ammunition packaging after hot-cold 
temperature cycling and can lead to accelerated corrosion of metal items. Propellant 
stability is also particularly at risk from high humidity and high temperatures, and 
those risks are further discussed in sub section 4.8. The IATG recommends that 
ammunition should ideally be stored at a temperature between 5° C and 25° C 
with a relative humidity no greater than 75%. 49)  Where possible, stand-off solar 
protection should be provided for shipping containers to reduce the direct effects of 
solar heating. Figure 7 shows an example of environmental protection fitted above 
containers used for the storage of ammunition in Central Asia. Simple measures, 
such as painting storage containers white can significantly reduce the effects of 
direct solar heating. Similarly, the opening of doors during the hottest parts of the 
day can improve airflow and lower the maximum temperature of the stock within 
the container. Field expedient methods of using water bottles to assess the risk 
of condensation are also simple and effective to implement.
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Figure 7 – Environmental Protection on Shipping Container Based Ammunition Storage. 50)
Lightning is a particular hazard in tropical conditions where thunderstorms may be 
both violent and prevalent. Lightning hazards should be mitigated through the use 
of lightning protection systems (LPS) and this is considered in greater detail in 
Section 4.6.5.
4.5 STORAGE BY HAZARD DIVISION AND COMPATIBILITY GROUP
Ammunition Storage by Hazard Division
To promote the safe transport of dangerous goods, an internationally agreed system 
for classification was devised by the UN 51), which is now used globally. Whilst initially 
produced for the transport of dangerous goods, the principles have been applied 
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by many states as the basis for a simplified consequential hazard and risk assess-
ment for the storage of ammunition. 52) In most low-capacity and conflict-affected 
environments it is likely that responsibility for transport will rest with a government 
department other than the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence and the 
facilitation of international trade, rather than hazard management, will be the most 
important factor governing the development of national legislation and regulations.
Ammunition, under the generic term ‘explosives’, is one of nine internationally 
recognised categories of dangerous goods as shown in Table 1. 53)
Table 1 – International Dangerous Goods Class Definitions.
Class Description Comments
1 Explosive substances and articles Divided into 6 hazard 
divisions
2 Gases Divided into 3 hazard 
divisions
3 Flammable Liquids
4 Flammable Solids, Spontaneously 
Combustible Materials, and Dangerous 
when Wet Materials
Divided into 3 hazard 
divisions
5 Oxidisers and Organic Peroxides Divided into 2 hazard 
divisions
6 Toxic Materials and Infectious Substances Divided into 2 hazard 
divisions
7 Radioactive Materials
8 Corrosive Materials
9 Miscellaneous Dangerous Substances and 
Articles
It is an essential rule that ammunition classified in International Dangerous Goods Class 1 
shall not be stored or transported with other dangerous goods in any other class.
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The hazard classification code (HCC) assigned to an ammunition item relates to its 
packaged condition. Unpackaged or poorly packaged ammunition may have a different, 
and more hazardous HCC, to the properly packaged item.
Ammunition Storage by Compatibility Group
The IATG provides comprehensive guidelines on the mixing rules governing the 
storage of ammunition by compatibility group. 54) In conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments it is strongly recommended that the minimum number of differing types 
of ammunition nature by compatibility group are stored in the same storage location. 
The following natures should always be stored in separate or segregated 55) storage :
• Ammunition containing white phosphorous ;
• Detonators ;
• Damaged ammunition ;
• Recovered or captured ammunition 56) ;
• Ammunition in an unknown condition ;
• Bulk propellants and artillery and tank propelling charges ;
• Pyrotechnics and fireworks ;
• Ammunition designated for disposal.
Ammunition containing a white phosphorous filling (compatibility group H) poses 
challenges in storage as white phosphorous melts at a relatively low temperature 
thus is prone to leakage. 57) The IATG specifies additional measures that should 
be taken regarding the storage of ammunition containing white phosphorous in 
order to reduce the hazard associated with leaking ammunition. 58) Some complex 
munitions that contain liquid propellants also have specific handling characteristics 
and safety issues, which must be considered during storage and processing.
Ammunition Stock Segregation and Separation
Where space or resources preclude or render it impossible to apply the compatibility 
group mixing rules specified in the IATG 59) then the following practical measures 
may be taken to mitigate risk in the immediate term with a view to applying the IATG 
more comprehensively in the longer term :
• Use of Inert Barriers within ESHs. Inert barriers are an effective method of 
achieving segregation of stock within an ESH. Some purpose designed barrier 
systems consist of interlocking polymer box sections that can be filled with water 
or sand. Such systems, being transportable, are ideal for use around ready-use 
ammunition associated with aircraft. An example of a polymer-filled modular 
interlocking barrier system is shown in Figure 8 and a water-filled barrier system 
in Figure 9. A similar, but less robust, effect may be achieved with inert filled 
sandbags or ammunition boxes.
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Figure 8 – Polymer Modular Interlocking Barrier System. 60)
Figure 9 – Water Filled Barriers in a Multi-National Ammunition Storage Point. 61)
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• Use of Lower Hazard Division Ammunition within ESHs. Interposing am-
munition in hazard division 1.4 between stacks of ammunition with a higher 
hazard division can also be effective. In the event of an incident in an ESH, the 
separation of stacks of hazard division 1.1 ammunition with hazard division 1.4 
will reduce 62), but not eliminate the probability of an entire ESH contents being 
subjected to prompt initiation. It should be noted though that all stock in the 
affected ESH will be rendered unserviceable.
• Use of Detonator Bays. If detonators 63) or fuzes in compatibility group B must 
be stored with their parent natures it is important that a degree of separation is 
interposed between them. This may be achieved using sandbags, filled empty 
ammunition boxes, or other expedient barrier systems. The objective of the 
barrier should be to prevent direct line of site between any of the ammunition 
containing compatibility group B natures and other ammunition stock, particular 
in hazard division 1.1, contained within the ESH.
• Separation of Unserviceable Stock. Unserviceable ammunition should be 
segregated from serviceable ammunition and should be disposed of at the 
earliest opportunity. A common factor in many previous UEMS has been the 
accumulation of excessive quantities of unserviceable ammunition. It is important 
that states do not regard unserviceable ammunition as an asset and that its safe 
disposal is afforded a high priority. In most conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments the expeditious disposal of unserviceable munitions will have an 
immediate and positive impact on safety.
4.6 FIRE PREVENTION
Fire prevention is a critical element of ammunition safety management. The IATG 
provides comprehensive guidance on fire prevention measures and also those 
steps that can be taken to prevent fires in vegetation and vehicles from spreading 
to structures containing ammunition. 64) The keys to effective fire prevention are 
the systematic elimination of ignition sources within the explosives storage or 
processing area and preventing the uncontrolled spread of fire.
Fire Prevention – Planning and Risk Assessment
For all sites where ammunition is stored and processed, a written fire plan and set 
of fire orders should be created. For major sites, contingency planning should also 
include any actions required by the local authorities adjacent to the site and should 
specify areas which may need to be evacuated in the event of a fire taking place. 
Planning for evacuation is critically important if civilian dwellings have encroached 
on the safeguarded area around the ammunition site i.e. buildings are within the 
calculated inhabited buildings distance (IBD) of the site.
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All staff within the site should be trained in immediate fire-fighting measures and 
suitable instructions should be displayed on signs. For ammunition natures that 
present a special hazard, such as those containing white phosphorus or liquid 
propellants, instructions should also be displayed in ESHs close to where these 
natures are stored.
Fire Fighting Equipment
The types and quantity of fire-fighting equipment which are available within a site 
should be capable of extinguishing the most likely sources of fire i.e. those originating 
from vehicles or fire propagated through dry vegetation. In most conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments it is unlikely that a pressurized emergency water 
supply system will be available to support fire-fighting operations throughout the 
site. In these circumstances, appropriate use should be made of static water 
supplies in tanks and ponds. Simple fire beaters are the most effective means of 
extinguishing grass fires. Fire extinguishers are expensive to acquire and maintain 
and may not be available in sufficient quantities to equip every individual ESH. In 
these circumstances, provision should be made to have fire extinguishers on hand 
during routine vehicle movements of ammunition. They could also be usefully 
carried on immediate response vehicles.
Prohibited Articles and Enforcement of No Smoking Areas
A major aspect of fire prevention is the denial of access of ignition sources into all 
areas where ammunition is stored and processed, this includes :
• Strict enforcement of contraband regulations and all smoking materials, lighters 
and matches should be prohibited ;
• Strict enforcement of no smoking areas and a clearly designated smoking area, 
outside of the explosives area, should exist. Pictogram based signs of a type 
similar to that shown at Figure 10 should be displayed prominently at all entrances 
to ammunition sites ;
Figure 10 – Pictogram Based No Smoking Sign.
43 |
04
 —
 I
m
pr
ov
in
g 
S
af
et
y 
– 
R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e 
R
is
k 
of
 A
cc
id
en
ta
l E
xp
lo
si
on
s
• Prohibition of the use of non-approved tools and equipment ;
• Mobile telephones and unauthorized radio transmitters should not be permitted 
within the explosives area 65) ;
• Cooking should only take place in nominated administrative areas and not within 
the explosives area ;
• Only authorised and serviceable vehicles should be permitted within the explosives 
area and all should be fitted with a fire extinguisher capable of extinguishing an 
engine or a tyre fire.
Contraband signs should indicate that the following items, unless specifically 
authorised, shall not be taken into an explosives facility :
• Matches and/or any other means of producing flame or high temperatures.
• Tobacco in any form, including snuff ;
• Any articles used in connection with smoking ;
• Radio transmitters or receivers, including mobile phones ;
• Tools and other equipment ;
• Any battery or mains operated item ;
• Unauthorized explosives ;
• Dangerous or flammable substances ;
• Cameras ;
• Firearms ;
• Drugs and medicines ;
• Metal shod footwear.
Control of Vegetation
Vegetation control is critically important to prevent the spread of fires within ASAs. 
The IATG provides basic guidance 66) on the control of vegetation as shown in 
Figure 11.
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Figure 11 – Fire Prevention – Vegetation Control in Explosive Storage Sites.
Where resources for grass cutting and vegetation control are limited, prioritization 
should be given to vegetation control during the periods of greatest fire hazard i.e. 
during dry seasons. The nature of the ammunition storage infrastructure present 
in the site determines the priority for vegetation control. It is recommended that 
vegetation control is addressed in the following descending order of priority :
• Open storage / stacks 67) ;
• Any explosive storage buildings constructed from flammable materials, such 
as those made of wood ;
• Explosives stored within unprotected or un-barricaded shipping containers ;
• Heavy walled buildings (reinforced concrete, concrete block, or brick) ;
• Earth covered buildings.
In some circumstances, trees may have been planted within the ASA in order to 
afford camouflage and concealment. Careful consideration should be given to 
balancing the needs of security and cover from observation, with the requirements 
of fire safety. Certain types of tree may eject firebrands over large distances when 
they are subject to fire and trees of this type should never be allowed to grow close 
to ammunition storage and processing buildings which incorporate flammable 
structural materials.
Vegetation should also be controlled adjacent to perimeter fences in order to prevent 
fires started outside propagating into the ASA. Where possible, all substantial 
accumulations of fuel such as trees and brushwood should be reduced within 30 m 
of an explosive storage or processing site. On completion of vegetation control, all 
cuttings should be removed from the ASA to reduce the latent fire hazard. Removal of 
vegetation adjacent to perimeter fences also aids observation thus improving security.
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Vegetation control should be carried out with appropriate and locally available equip-
ment. Hand tools and mechanical trimmers are entirely appropriate for vegetation 
control close to buildings containing explosives. More sophisticated machinery, 
required for extensive areas of grass cutting, may be too expensive to use in some 
low-capacity environments. Livestock are an effective way of controlling the growth 
of grasses and may be permitted to graze inside the safeguarded area of explosive 
facilities. Rodents and other burrowing mammals must be controlled within the 
explosive area as they can undermine and affect the integrity of barricades.
Lightning Protection
The distribution of lightning across the world is not evenly spread and in tropical 
areas the number of lightning episodes may be many times that seen in temperate 
regions. Figure 12 shows a graphical representation of global lightning activity.
In all areas, but especially those prone to a high-level of lightning strikes, LPS should 
be viewed not as an optional safety measure but a mandatory safety requirement. 
Where possible, ammunition should be stored within buildings equipped with 
serviceable LPS. For ammunition storage solutions based on shipping containers 
or lightweight metal buildings, the metal fabric of the building should be earthed. 
Where open stacks of ammunition are employed then fixed air termination type 
suspended LPS should be employed. LPS are vulnerable to damage and should 
be checked with appropriately calibrated equipment on a regular basis. 68)
The installation, maintenance and periodic testing of LPS is a specialist activity 
and it is essential that it is conducted by competent personnel. LPS should be 
considered during the planning stages of new facilities. Where LPS are required 
to be installed to protect existing facilities then suspended air termination network 
systems are often the simplest to install.
Figure 12 – Distribution of World Lightning Strikes. 69)
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4.7 MANAGEMENT AND SEGREGATION OF MILITARY PROPELLANTS
Hazards Associated with Military Propellants
The accidental or premature ignition of military propellants has been the assessed 
cause of some catastrophic UEMS. 70) Military propellants have an undesirable char-
acteristic in that they deteriorate with age, the rate of deterioration being dependent 
on the prevailing ambient temperature and humidity levels. 71) Ultimately, they can 
ignite spontaneously with devastating consequences. Most solid propellants used 
in military munitions are based on compositions which include nitrocellulose and 
other materials. Nitrocellulose, an energetic material which falls within the nitrate 
ester group of chemical compounds, poses some significant issues in terms of its 
safety and longevity in storage. Propellants form a key component of many military 
munitions and examples are shown at Figure 13.
Figure 13 – Military Propellants. 72)
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The inherent instability of propellants based on nitrocellulose is well known and 
has been studied extensively. The effects of weather, hot temperatures, direct solar 
radiation, daily temperature changes (diurnal cycling) and high humidity may rapidly 
degrade the performance and safety of explosives. Ammunition is designed for use 
under stated climatic conditions, and its service life will be significantly reduced if it 
is stored under climatic conditions that it was not designed for. In some cases, the 
ammunition may rapidly become unserviceable and unsafe. Prolonged storage at 
elevated temperatures and humidity has a definite detrimental effect on propellant 
shelf life. During prolonged periods of storage, the rate of chemical deterioration of 
propellant is approximately doubled for every 10°C rise in temperature above 30°C. 73)
Accidental or UEMS caused by propellant fires are far from uncommon as evidence 
gathered by a number of sources suggests. 74) It has been suggested that auto-ignition 
of propellant is a significant cause of explosions and is a major risk where ammunition 
surveillance is limited or non-existent ; however, it becomes a minor risk where 
appropriate ammunition surveillance practices are applied. 75)
Reducing the Hazard Posed by Military Propellants
The following steps should be taken to reduce the hazard posed by ammunition 
containing propellants. Ammunition containing military propellants should :
• Be stored in separate storage ;
• Not be stored with ammunition classified in hazard division 1.1 i.e. ammunition 
possessing a mass-explosion hazard 76) ;
• Have its shelf-life monitored closely through a process of in-service surveillance 
and shelf life expired propellants should be disposed of as quickly as possible ;
• Be stored in storage locations with minimum vulnerability to fire (see section 
on fire prevention) ;
• Stored so that storekeepers can gain easy access to all stock in order that they 
may detect early evidence of propellant deterioration. 77)
Mortar primary and augmenting cartridges often contain substantial quantities of 
double base propellants, which are prone to stabilizer depletion and spontaneous 
ignition and have been the suggested cause of a number of UEMS. It is recommended 
that mortar ammunition is stored in a separate ESH to other ammunition classified 
in hazard division 1.1.
If appropriate temperature logging equipment is available, consideration should be 
given to monitoring the temperature inside ESHs used for the storage of propellants. 
The data derived from logging may be used, over time, to inform decisions on the 
safe shelf life of ammunition natures. 78)
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4.8 DESTRUCTION OF UNSAFE AND SURPLUS STOCK
Overview of Destruction Methods
The methodology to be adopted is governed by the quantity of ammunition that 
requires disposal and the environmental conditions applicable in the country of 
operation. Open burning (OB) or open detonation (OD) is often the most cost-effective 
method. 79) Disposal by demilitarization is usually more complex and expensive than 
disposal by OB/OD and this may be a significant consideration for most low-capacity 
environments.
Open Burning (OB) and Open Detonation (OD)
Disposal by OB/OD is the simplest and most effective method of achieving the safe 
disposal of large quantities of stocks. OB is a technique particularly appropriate for the 
disposal of bulk propellants. Figure 14 shows a number of artillery propelling charges 
laid out in preparation for OD. Figure 15 shows the same charges after ignition.
Figure 14 – Preparation of Propelling Charges for Open Burning. 80)
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Figure 15 – Propelling Charges Undergoing Open Burning. 81)
For OD, it is important that sufficient quantities of HE donor charges are made 
available if OD is to be conducted reliably and safely. In planning the disposal of 
munitions by OD, care should be taken to ensure that sufficient high NEQ munitions 
are included when low NEQ munitions are selected for destruction. Reliable OD, 
with correspondingly low toxic gaseous emissions, requires an appropriately sized 
explosive donor charge if unexploded items ejected from demolition pits are to 
be prevented.
Figure 16 shows the large-scale disposal of missiles being undertaken using OD ; 
note the extensive use of high NEC anti-tank mines as donor charges and each 
individual donor charge is connected to a detonating cord ring main to ensure that 
all charges are detonated near simultaneously.
Destruction of Small Arms Ammunition
The disposal of small arms ammunition and other low NEQ items such as pyro-
technics can be a problem in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments. 
While purpose-built incinerators are the most effective means of destroying these 
items, simple field-expedient burning tanks may be fabricated from sheet metal and 
employed to good effect.
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Figure 16 – Large-Scale Logistic Ammunition Disposal using Open Detonation. 82)
Logistic disposal of large quantities of ammunition is a complex and potentially 
hazardous activity, especially when conducted in areas of high population density. It 
is essential that demolitions are appropriately planned and supervised, and that due 
cognisance is taken of safety at all stages in the disposal process. It is especially 
important that central demolition sites (CDS) are located in safe areas and have 
been subject to a safety assessment conducted by a competent person.
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The previous section focused on those activities which could be undertaken to improve 
safety at ammunition sites by preventing an accidental explosion occurring in the 
first place. This section focuses on those actions which could be taken to mitigate 
the effects of an accidental explosion, should it occur.
5.1 EXPLOSIVE LICENSING AND THE USE OF QUANTITY DISTANCES
The single most important measure in mitigating the effects of an accident or a UEMS 
is the appropriate use of Quantity Distances (QDs). This subject is covered in detail 
in the IATG. 83)
It should be noted that the use of QDs does not guarantee that damage and injuries 
will not occur in the event of an accident or explosion. It is possible that injuries may 
still be caused through high angle fragments being projected from an explosion 
site and secondary fragments from glazing may also be a particular problem. Air 
blast from large explosions may also interact in a catastrophic way with poorly 
constructed dwellings and structures.
Inside Quantity Distances
The inside quantity distance (IQD) is the minimum permissible distance between a 
potential explosion site (PES) and an exposed site (ES) inside the explosives area. 
The inter-magazine distance (IMD) refers to the minimum permissible distance 
between a building or stack containing explosives and the location of other such 
buildings or stacks which will prevent the immediate propagation of explosions or 
fire from one to the other by missile, flame or blast. 84)
The most important consideration in an ASA is ensuring that the quantity of explosives 
stored in individual ESHs does not exceed that permitted by the available IMD. If the  
IMD is exceeded then it is probable that an explosion at a single ESH will lead to the prompt 
propagation of explosions at adjacent ESHs, meaning the resultant consequences will be 
based on the aggregated NEQ of all affected ESHs, with potentially catastrophic results far 
beyond what was originally envisioned.
The principal difference between achieving and not achieving compliance with IMD 
is the magnitude of the event associated with an accidental explosion at a single ESH. 
If IMD quantity distances are achieved, then an accidental explosion at a single 
site is likely to affect only a single ESH. If IMD quantity distances are not achieved, 
then it is probable that the ammunition contents at multiple sites will detonate 
promptly and this may result in the propagation of a mass explosion to other adjacent 
ESHs, with probable catastrophic implications. The necessity of compliance with 
IQDs is shown in the scenarios described at Figure 17 and Figure 18.
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Figure 17 – Inside Quantity Distance Example – Inter Magazine Distance Not Achieved. 85)
Figure 18 – Inside Quantity Distance Example – Inter Magazine Distance Achieved.
In evaluating QDs at ammunition sites it is recommended that IQDs are considered 
first and that the total NEQ of explosives stored at individual PESs is adjusted so 
that a satisfactory IMD can be achieved. This approach will ensure that if an accident 
or explosion does occur, it is likely to affect only a single PES. While the QD tables 
in the IATG provide separation distances on stored quantities of explosive up to 
250,000 kg, it is strongly recommended that in conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments ESH explosive contents are generally restricted to less than 10,000 kg 
NEQ.
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In most existing ammunition storage and processing facilities it will be necessary 
to calculate the maximum NEQ of ammunition in a given hazard division which 
may be stored based on the current ‘as built’ facility configuration. If adjacent ESHs 
are of light structure and are un-barricaded then for QD purposes they must be 
considered as open stacks when calculating the IMD. If space and the ground permits, 
the IMD may be reduced or the NEQ of explosive stored increased, by the use of 
receptor and interceptor barricades between the ES and PES. The use of barricades 
is considered in greater detail later in this section.
Outside Quantity Distances
The outside quantity distance (OQD) is the minimum permissible distance between 
a PES and an ES outside the explosives area. The inhabited building distance (IBD), 
vulnerable building distance (VBD) and public traffic route distance (PTRD) are all 
types of OQD. To minimize the risk of casualties during a potential UEMS, it is the IBD 
which should be considered. QD tables in the IATG are extrapolated from empirical 
data and trials and relate to buildings which may have substantially more robust 
methods of construction than those which may be found in many conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments. In considering the use of OQDs in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments it is recommended that a conservative approach 
be adopted and that if buildings adjacent to ammunition storage and processing 
facilities are assessed to be of poor construction then the QDs relating to the VBD 
should be employed.
The maintenance of a safeguarded area around ASAs in conflict-affected and low-ca-
pacity environments may be quite difficult, especially where there is limited national 
legislation or regional regulations relating to building planning and consent. Where 
possible, new ASAs should be planned and sited such that the IBD for the planned 
amount of explosive stored falls within the perimeter of the site thus eliminating 
the potential for future encroachment on the safeguarded area. Over time, it is 
possible that new public traffic routes or footpaths may be brought into use which 
encroach on the safeguarded area. Where possible, these public traffic routes 
should be re-routed and those particularly hazarded by the ASA should be closed.
Reducing the Size of the Maximum Credible Event
The maximum credible event (MCE) is a measure of the size of the worst-case 
explosive event which could take place at an ammunition storage site. The size of 
the MCE is determined largely by the type of infrastructure in use at the site and 
the effective and appropriate use of IQDs.
The size of the MCE may be reduced by the use of compartmentalization within a 
given site such that the risks associated with the prompt detonation of an entire ESH 
contents are reduced. This may be achieved through the use of internal barricades, or 
interposing ammunition stock in HD 1.4 between and higher hazard division stacks.
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In ammunition processing facilities, care should be taken to ensure that excessive 
quantities of stock do not build up and only a reasonable amount of exposed 
ammunition, sufficient to facilitate efficient processing operation, is present at any 
one time. Similarly, the quantity of ammunition packages which are opened within 
a processing facility at any one time should also be limited.
Explosive Licensing
Comprehensive guidance is provided in the IATG on the rationale and process for 
development of explosive limit licences (ELL). 86) The analysis of an ammunition and 
explosive processing area provides the firm baseline on which explosive risks can 
be demonstrated to be ALARP. The use of QD tables and ELLs has the following 
prerequisites :
• It should be conducted by competent and experienced staff who are capable of 
assessing ASA infrastructure, applying QD tables and producing ELLs ;
• It requires that the ammunition stock has either been hazard classified by 
a competent authority or has been assigned an interim hazard division and 
compatibility group ;
• Technical information relating to the NEQ of ammunition is known, or can be 
acquired from a reliable source ;
• The personnel charged with the operation of the site are capable of reading and 
understanding ELLs, applying aggregation rules, and calculating the total NEQ 
of ammunition stored in a particular ESH.
As an early step in implementing an ammunition safety system based on ELLs it is 
recommended that rather than solely specifying the total NEQ of explosive which 
may be stored, it is also specified in terms of a specific quantity of ammunition 
natures. For example, in a given ESH the maximum quantity of HD 1.1 ammunition 
to be stored may be expressed as :
• 10,000 kg NEQ hazard division 1.1 ; or
• 1,460 Shell 155mm M107 HE (73 pallets).
5.2 SAFEGUARDING EXPLOSIVES STORAGE AREAS
Safeguarding is the means by which hazards caused by the location and operation of 
ammunition storage and processing facilities in proximity to the civilian population 
are reduced to an acceptable level. In order to minimise these hazards should an 
explosion occur, QDs from inhabited buildings, roads, railways and other places 
frequented by people are used. Given that the safe distances defined by QDs often 
extend beyond the physical perimeter of an explosive storage or processing facility. 
Safeguarding is the process by which encroachment into these areas is prevented. 87)
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A common feature in many previous catastrophic UEMS has been uncontrolled 
building within the safeguarded areas in the proximity of munitions storage facilities. 
There are a number of unpalatable choices for states in situations where uncontrolled 
urban expansion has resulted in large numbers of inhabited dwellings being built in 
safeguarded areas, they are :
• Close the site and move ammunition to an area where QDs can be achieved ;
• Reduce the quantity of explosive stored at the site to protect the inhabited 
buildings which are now in the safeguarded are ;
• Remove the inhabited buildings which are within the safeguarded area.
The UEMS which occurred in Lagos 88) and Brazzaville 89) provide ample example 
of the catastrophic impact of UEMS where inhabited buildings exist within the 
safeguarded area.
In the longer term, the enforcement of safeguarded areas needs to be enshrined 
in national legislation and regulations which prohibit the development of structures 
within the safeguarded areas of ammunition facilities. All problems of safeguarded 
are encroachment can be eliminated if ammunition storage and processing facilities 
are developed in areas of low population and the safeguarded area i.e. the area 
inside the IBD or VBD, is contained entirely within the perimeter of the facility.
5.3  PRACTICAL MEASURES TO PREVENT THE PROMPT INITIATION OF 
ADJACENT EXPLOSIVE STORE HOUSES
Barricades
Barricades have an important part to play in reducing the risk of prompt initiation 
of multiple ESHs following an explosion at a single site. Barricades can either act 
as a screen at potential explosion sites, by intercepting low-angle high velocity 
fragments which pose the greatest risk of prompt initiation of other HE munitions 
or, to a more limited extent, protect exposed sites containing explosives in the same 
manner.
Barricades may be fabricated from a wide variety of materials and in their simplest 
form may be bulldozed and compacted mounds of earth. They should be constructed 
to an appropriate height and geometry to screen the structure being protected. In 
areas prone to high seasonal rainfall, earth mounds may be vulnerable to damage 
through the erosion effects of water runoff. Rodents and other small burrowing 
mammals can also quickly affect the integrity of barricades or earth covered buildings.
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If the QD associated with barricaded storage is to be used then it is essential that 
the barricade is constructed in accordance with the IATG. 90) The effectiveness of 
gabion-based barricade solutions is shown at Figure 19. The barricade (on the left 
of the photograph), with a stand-off of less than 8 metres, intercepted all low-angle 
fragments from the ESH (on the right of the photograph) in which the explosion 
occurred.
Figure 19 –  Container-Based Barricade Demonstrated in a Large-Scale  
Explosive Storage Trial. 91)
Overhead Protection
Overhead protection on ESHs and APBs serves a number of important functions :
• It provides a measure of protection from high-angle projected munitions in the 
event of an explosion at an adjacent ESH ;
• It provides a degree of stock protection where indirect fire weapons such as 
mortars and free flight rockets are a threat ;
• Earth covered buildings and blast resistant structures also provide considerable 
protection from blast, fragmentation and thermal effects from explosions in 
adjacent ESHs.
In order to be effective, overhead protection should consist of a minimum of 600 mm 
of earth or other loose material. A lesser thickness of reinforced concrete will have 
the same effect.
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5.4 MANAGING EXPLOSIONS IN AMMUNITION STORAGE AREAS
An accidental explosion at an ASA is a very serious event and all actions taken 
following an explosion should be aimed at reducing the risk to life and serious injury, 
and to preventing further explosions from occurring. Responding to an explosion 
at an ASA is a complex activity and specialized skills are necessary to address 
these hazards and is covered in the IATG. 92) The following specific hazards should 
be considered :
• Ammunition Armed on Ejection. Ammunition may have been projected some 
distance from the explosion site. If the ammunition has been stored in a fuzed state, 
then it is possible that the forces imparted to the ammunition during the explosion 
could be similar to the forces required to arm the fuze. In these circumstances the 
munition must be considered to be armed and dealt with accordingly ;
• Partially Burnt Ammunition. Some explosive compositions become significantly 
more sensitive when exposed to high temperatures or fires 93) ;
• Exposure of Hazardous Fillings. Some ammunition natures may have been 
broken open leading to the exposure of other hazardous fillings or explosive items, 
such as white phosphorous or sub munitions. Damaged fuzes and detonators 
may also contain exposed sensitive primary explosives ;
• Exposure of Sensitive Initiation Systems. Ammunition may have been broken 
open leading to exposed electrical leads, rendering the item more vulnerable to 
accidental initiation through lightning or static electricity ;
• Propellant Hazards. Propellant which has not burnt during the explosion may 
spontaneously ignite during EOD clearance operations ; such ignition will be de-
pendent on the chemical condition of the propellant and the ambient temperature ;
• Buried Munitions. Buried munitions will remain at the site of the initial explosion ;
• Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards. Ammunition that has been involved 
in an explosion, but did not deflagrate or detonate, may be more susceptible to 
deterioration in poor weather. The risks of premature detonation will increase 
significantly during thunder storms and further explosive events initiated by 
lightning strikes may occur ;
• Potential Collapse of Buildings. The remaining ESH infrastructure is very likely 
to be in an unstable condition, thus posing a collapse risk to personnel ;
• Contamination of Water Sources. Exposed explosives may contaminate surface 
and sub-surface water. TNT, the HE most commonly used in indirect fire munitions 
and other large warheads, poses a particular environmental hazard through 
contamination of ground water sources.
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Wherever ammunition stores have exploded, explosive items will contaminate 
the surrounding area. Mechanical inspection is the most efficient method to remove 
the contamination from areas that are close to the storage site whereas manual 
techniques are more effective in areas of lower density UXO contamination. 
Sub-surface clearance requires the use of sensitive search equipment.
In the event of a significant UEMS it may be necessary for the assistance of interna-
tional entities to be sought in order that an expeditious clearance may take place. 
This is covered in greater detail in Section  10.
5.5 MINIMISING PERSONNEL EXPOSURE INSIDE AMMUNITION FACILITIES
Access Control 94)
The simplest method of reducing the number of personnel exposed to hazard within 
and ammunition storage and processing facility is through the strict enforcement 
of access control. It is also good practice to ensure that only those personnel 
which have a requirement to be located within the limits defined by the IBD are 
provided with authority to enter the site. Administrative facilities, such as offices, 
canteens and garaging should normally be located at a greater distance than that 
defined by the IBD.
Enforcement of Personnel Limits 95)
All activities and licensed locations within a site should have defined personnel limits. 
The authorized personnel limit should be set at the minimum level to complete a 
specified task and if there is a requirement to exceed this limit then authority should 
be granted by the supervisory staff at the site. Personnel limits are particularly 
important for those activities which are assessed as high risk, such as the processing 
of ammunition within a workshop or APB.
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The physical infrastructure i.e. the location of the ASA and the buildings 96) where 
ammunition is stored has an important part to play in any ammunition safety manage-
ment system. 97) As resources are often limited, it may not be feasible to construct 
new facilities and existing infrastructure may need to be modified to improve safety. 
This section examines the practical considerations in acquiring new and modifying 
existing ammunition storage and processing infrastructure.
The development of new or the enhancement of existing ammunition facilities is 
often a resource intensive activity and it is essential that expert advice is obtained 
on the suitability and appropriateness of a proposed solution. It is recommended 
that all plans are subject to peer-review and adherence with the IATG at the planning 
stage is evaluated.
This section contains guidance additional to the IATG based on good practices on  
the ground.
6.1 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Land Rights and Availability of Real Estate
Land rights and ownership of land should be considered before a site is selected for 
the storage of ammunition. Ideally, the entire site covered by the physical ammunition 
storage infrastructure and the area which is required to be safeguarded should all 
be under the ownership or lease of the state.
Strategic National Plan for Ammunition Infrastructure
The following factors should be considered during the requirements specification 
phase for new or upgraded ammunition facilities :
• The total size of the ammunition stockpile which is required to be stored ;
• Any geographical requirements which may impact on the location of the facility, 
such as : proximity to operational units, requirements to support training, and 
external threats ;
• Any requirements for munitions with specialist handling or processing 
characteristics.
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Affordability
Cost is paramount in low-capacity environments and it is essential that both national 
and international donor-delivered ammunition storage and processing solutions 
are capable of being maintained locally, especially given the scarcity of resources. 
In tropical conditions, steel storage systems will degrade quickly if they are not 
treated with an effective corrosion inhibitor. Generally, complex electronic intrusion 
detection systems and video camera systems should be avoided in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments as they are both costly and difficult to maintain.
Ease of Construction and Availability of Materials
Ease of construction is a significant factor for consideration in developing ammu-
nition storage and processing infrastructure for conflict-affected and low-capacity 
environments. In low-capacity environments the most appropriate solutions are often 
those which involve modular systems, fabricated off-site, which can be installed 
without the need for complex plant and equipment. Alternatively, simple concrete 
block-built structures with reinforced concrete roofs are entirely appropriate, if the 
basic raw materials and the personnel to build them are available.
In many conflict-affected and low-capacity environments, basic construction materials 
of a quality standard appropriate for the construction of ammunition facilities are 
not available. In these circumstances it may be appropriate to source materials or 
solutions directly from experienced providers in foreign countries.
Modular Solutions
Modular ammunition processing and storage solutions are available from a number 
of suppliers and some may be procured under UN long term agreement (LTA) 
procurement procedures.
Environmental Protection of Stock
In many conflict-affected and low-capacity environments the climate is an enemy 
and high temperatures during diurnal cycles as well as high humidity are often a 
problem. In these circumstances, priority should be given to providing environmental 
protection for ammunition.
Licensing of Ammunition Sites and Acknowledgement of  
Residual Risks
At all stages in the planning and construction of an ammunition facility consideration 
should be given to how the site will eventually be licensed and, where possible, 
adherence with the IATG should be sought. In circumstances where it is not possible 
to achieve adherence with the IATG then an ESC should be developed in order that 
the residual risks present with the operation of the site are known and acknowledged 
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by the local and national authorities. 98) In conflict-affected settings, where UN or a 
regional force is responsible for providing security under an international mandate, 
the ESC should be acknowledged by the UN or Regional Force Commander.
6.2 USE OF OPEN AMMUNITION STACKS
Open stacks represent the simplest form of ammunition storage though it is more 
often employed during field storage operations. For explosive licensing purposes, 
lightweight buildings are often regarded as open stacks for licensing purposes. 
Open stacks are not recommended for permanent or semi-permanent storage 
facilities for the following reasons :
• Ammunition is completely exposed to the elements and has no protection from 
extreme temperatures in diurnal cycling ;
• Open stacks represent the least secure form of ammunition storage and if ASA 
perimeter protection systems are compromised then direct access to ammunition 
is possible ;
• Open and un-barricaded stacks represent the worst case QDs (i.e. greatest 
separation distances) for both IQD and OQD ;
• Open stacks are particular vulnerable to attack by indirect fire or by weaponized 
drones) 99) ;
• Uncut vegetation in proximity to open stacks poses a significant fire risk.
6.3 SHIPPING CONTAINER BASED STORAGE SOLUTIONS
Ammunition storage solutions based on shipping containers have been widely used 
and have the advantage of being based on a readily available product, the ISO standard 
shipping container. An example of an ammunition store based on a shipping container 
is shown at Figure 20. There are some significant disadvantages associated with 
the use of standard shipping containers for ammunition storage :
• In hot conditions stand-off shades must be provided to prevent the containers 
heating up through the direct effects of solar radiation ;
• Shipping containers lack inherent strength and rigidity to support overhead 
protection without substantial supporting members being put in place. These 
additional structural supports may pose a significant secondary fragmentation 
hazard in the event of an explosion inside the store ;
• Shipping containers may be become warped and the doors difficult to open and 
close if the supporting structures are not built to close tolerances ;
• Security may be a problem with shipping containers as the walls and doors are 
simple to penetrate with commonly available tools.
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Figure 20 – Shipping Container Based Magazine with Overhead Protection. 100)
An alternative solution, which is particularly suitable for surface laid solutions with 
barricades but no overhead protection, is the purpose-built magazine. Figure 21 
shows an example of a magazine that has been employed in conflict-affected and 
low-capacity environments in Africa. It has the handling advantages of a shipping 
container, but its bespoke nature addresses the disadvantages highlighted above 
regarding ISO shipping containers when used as ammunition storage solutions.
Figure 21 – Example of a Purpose Made Surface Magazine. 101)
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6.4 LIGHT WALLED STRUCTURES
Light walled ammunition storage and processing structures are ideal for providing 
environmental protection to ammunition stock where there is sufficient space to 
achieve the IMD IQD, usually with barricading, and there is no requirement for 
overhead protection from indirect fire. A key benefit of light structures is that the 
building materials do not generally add significantly to the secondary fragmentation 
hazard in the event that an explosion occurs within the ESH.
A light-walled ammunition storage solution is shown in Figure 22. In this example, 
individual ESHs have been barricaded with multiple layers of container-based 
barricades and the barricades have been stacked to a sufficient height to reduce 
the probability of a low-angle high velocity fragments from an explosion at one 
ESH causing prompt sympathetic detonation of ammunition in adjacent ESHs. In 
most countries the construction materials to be used are widely available in the 
commercial buildings sector and facilitate the simple inclusion of electrical services, 
air conditioning and lightning protection systems.
Figure 22 – Barricaded Light Walled Frangible Ammunition Storage Solution. 102)
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6.5 COMPARTMENTED LIGHT-WALLED STRUCTURES
Compartmented light-walled structures are appropriate for a variety of conflict- 
affected and low-capacity environments and are particularly useful for small storage 
units, especially where ammunition natures with different compatibility groups 
must be stored. An example of a compartmented light-walled structure, which 
was built in North Africa, is shown in Figure 23. The building is made from entirely 
non-flammable materials and has walls fabricated from concrete blocks, a reinforced 
concrete roof, and each compartment has individually lockable metal doors. The 
advantages of this type of ESH are :
• It allows incompatible munitions to be stored in separate compartments ;
• Each compartment may be secured separately thus allowing individual sub units 
to have secure access to their own compartments, but not others ;
• The entire store may be licensed as a single PES, in this case in IATG terms, a 
barricaded light building or open stack ;
• It provides environmental protection to the stored munitions ;
• It is inexpensive and requires only simple plant and machinery to construct ;
• It may be used with both palletized and boxed ammunition ;
• The reinforced concrete roof provides some protection from fragmenting indirect 
fire weapons or in the event of an explosion at an adjacent ESH, lobbed firebrands 
and munitions.
Figure 23 – Compartmented Light-Walled Structure in North Africa. 103)
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6.6 PRE-FABRICATED EARTH COVERED MAGAZINE
There are a number of issues associated with implementing concrete ‘igloo’-type 
earth covered magazines. While the ‘igloo’ magazine represents the safest solution 
in terms of minimising IQDs and OQDs, they are very expensive to construct and 
require fairly advanced civil engineering capabilities to be present in the country 
of construction.
One possible solution is to use pre-fabricated metal box structures which are placed 
on a concrete pad and then covered with earth to the desired depth. This type of 
structure can be implemented quickly and for the fraction of the cost of a conventional 
‘igloo’ type magazine. Figure 24 and Figure 25 show a schematic and an ‘as built’ 
example of a pre-fabricated earth covered magazine.
Figure 24 – Pre-Fabricated Metal Earth Covered Magazine – Schematic. 104)
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Figure 25 – Pre-Fabricated Metal Earth Covered Magazine - As Built. 105)
The advantages of this type of ESH are :
• It can be delivered to the site fully constructed and requires only basic site prepa-
ration, positioning and earth covering before it is taken into use ;
• The complete kit can be delivered to the site with all necessary services such as 
ventilation and LPS ;
• It is a significantly more affordable solution than a purpose built reinforced concrete 
earth covered magazine ;
• The completed store may be licensed under the IATG as an earth covered 
magazine with consequent benefits for IQD and OQD ;
• The earth covering and metal structure provides excellent protection from indirect 
fire munitions and lobbed munitions and firebrands from adjacent ESHs.
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6.7 ENHANCING EXISTING AMMUNITION INFRASTRUCTURE
General Considerations for Rehabilitation and Reinforcement of 
Existing ASA Structures
In reviewing the appropriateness of upgrading or replacing 106) existing ammunition 
storage and processing structures, the following should be considered :
• The cost of rehabilitation – is it cheaper to refurbish or build new ?
• Is the existing site configuration suitable in terms of QDs ?
• Is it necessary to introduce additional barricades in order to provide satisfactory 
IQD and OQD ?
• Are existing buildings appropriate for use as ESH or APB i.e. are they : 
constructed from flammable materials ; have tiled roofs ; and are there 
windows in the structures 107) ?
• Is the structure secure or capable of being secured ?
• Is site contamination a potential issue ?
07
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The term ‘security’ refers to the measures taken to prevent the theft of ammunition, 
entry by unauthorised persons into explosive storage areas, and other undesirable 
acts, such as sabotage. 108) There is a temptation when considering security measures 
to only concentrate on ‘hard’ security infrastructure, such as fences, gates, barriers, 
locks and intrusion detection systems. Yet often, the weakest link in a security system 
is that introduced by humans and due cognisance must be taken of personnel 
security measures such as : selection and vetting personnel, personnel access 
controls, and searching at the entrances to ammunition storage and processing 
facilities. A thorough security risk assessment is at the foundation of any effective 
security management system. It is useful when evaluating security threats to consider 
an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ threat-based model. Significant investment in physical 
security measures may be wasted if staff are poorly paid and prone to bribery and 
corruption. Crime and terrorism often exploit people at the low wage end of the 
economy thus it may be more cost effective in low-capacity environments to invest 
in better paid people than expensive and difficult-to-maintain security equipment. 
A key aspect of all security infrastructure is to impose delay on those attempting 
to gain unauthorised access to ammunition. It is important that physical security 
checks and patrols within ammunition facilities are conducted at a frequency which 
denies unauthorised personnel the time to access the facility, gain access to an 
individual ESH, and then leave the facility undetected.
7.1 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
A baseline security risk assessment is a key prerequisite to developing security 
systems which are appropriate to the level of threat posed to the ammunition 
stockpile. The local context and threats are particularly important in developing the 
security risk assessment and a wide range of relevant factors should be considered 
before any steps are taken to develop security systems or implement security 
infrastructure projects. In conflict-affected and low-capacity environments, the 
following criteria in particular should be considered :
• The probability of stockpile diversion given prevailing threats ;
• The security hazards arising as a result of catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, 
and fires ;
• Vulnerability of the stockpile to theft or diversion ;
• Vulnerability of the stockpile to sabotage or terrorist attack.
In defining the requirements for security management, the IATG recommends 
that all security measures are based on a thorough evaluation of the security risks. 
Ideally, physical security measures should be developed at the same time as the 
ammunition facility is being designed. Personnel security is a critical part of any 
security system and suitable measures should be incorporated for vetting staff as 
well as ensuring that visitors or temporary staff are escorted at all times.
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Security plans and security operating procedures (SyOPs) form an important part 
of any security management system and it essential that all staff associated with 
the operation and management of ammunition facilities are accountable and aware 
of the site-specific plans and SyOPs.
7.2  SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE APPROPRIATE FOR CONFLICT-AFFECTED 
AND LOW-CAPACITY ENVIRONMENTS 109)
Screening of Personnel
Security screening of personnel should take place on two levels. Firstly, all full-time 
members of the ammunition facility should be subjected to some form of vetting 
process to ensure that they are not affiliated to criminal or terrorist organisations 
or have previously committed crimes of violence or dishonesty. In conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments the thoroughness of the vetting process will depend 
on the maturity of national criminal justice system and the availability of police 
records as well as the capabilities and records of the domestic intelligence service, 
if they exist at all.
All personnel entering and exiting ammunition sites should be subject to some form 
of screening and be searched if thought necessary. Personnel screening serves 
two purposes : firstly, from a security perspective, it reduces the opportunity of 
unauthorized items such as weapons and explosives from being brought or taken 
out from the site ; secondly, from a safety perspective, it ensures that contraband 
materials are not brought onto the site. 110)  The searching of personnel on departure 
from ammunition sites acts as a deterrent to theft.
Perimeter Security and Lighting
The most effective approach to perimeter security is to consider defence in depth. 
Perimeter fences serve to provide a degree of physical, psychological or legal 
deterrence to intrusion. The approach to the outer perimeter fence should be cleared 
of all vegetation and no trees should be permitted to overhang any part of the 
fence. Vegetation should be cut back so that any attempts cut through or dig under 
the fence are immediately apparent to perimeter security patrols. It is strongly 
recommended that an outer perimeter fence be established and this should be 
of at least 2 metres height and affixed with warning signs in order to keep out the 
unwary or the curious. If dogs or armed guards are present then this should be 
indicated using pictograms on signs affixed to the fence. One possible approach 
to signs is shown in Figure 26. Any written words on the signs should be in the 
language(s) of the local population.
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Figure 26 – Perimeter Access Warning Signs.
The outer fence should not be fitted with any device which could inadvertently 
injure any person outside of the site perimeter. An inner fence represents the 
principal obstacle to personnel climbing into the site. It should have the following 
characteristics :
• Be difficult to climb in terms of height and configuration. Narrow welded meshes 
are much better than chain link ;
• Be fitted with barbed or razor wire sloping outwards from the site ;
• Be generally as straight as possible so as to reduce the vulnerabilities associated 
with corners and changes of direction in the fence ;
• Be securely buried in the ground to prevent an intruder from burrowing under the 
fence.
A number of options may be used to secure the area between inner and outer 
perimeter fences, such as :
• Stacked razor or barbed wire ;
• Cleared vegetation and free-running guard dogs ;
• Low-wire barbed wire entanglements with thorny vegetation (if it is available 
locally).
Fences should not be regarded as a significant barrier to entry and some would 
rightly consider them as a filter to keep out the harmless. Security fences do however 
serve a very useful purpose in permitting the freer use of armed guards and dogs 
with stronger rules of engagement for the use of force within the perimeter.
The use of anti-personnel mines, or other victim operated explosive devices affixed 
to or between fences is strongly discouraged.
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Perimeter lighting if planned and used carefully and in conjunction with regular 
patrols by dogs and armed guards can be an effective security measure. Perimeter 
lighting can however assist intruders as much as it assists the site security force. 111) 
Perimeter lighting is therefore not considered a priority for installation at ammunition 
sites in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments.
Main Gate and Perimeter Access Controls
The approach taken to site access control depends on the level of threat which 
exists at the site. In both low-capacity and conflict-affected settings it is necessary 
to implement measures which guarantee that personnel or vehicles cannot gain 
access to the site without going through some form of security screening process.
In conflict-affected environments, particularly where terrorism is a significant concern, 
much more robust measures must be taken to prevent concealed VBIEDs or armed 
extremists from gaining access to the site. Defence in depth is paramount in these 
circumstances. One possible main gate configuration is shown in Figure 27. The 
key requirement in these scenarios is to ensure that a thorough search of each 
vehicle and all personnel is conducted before they reach the final gate which grants 
access to the site. Appropriate use should be made of barricades around the access 
control point to limit the effects of a suicide VBIED being detonated during the 
search process.
Figure 27 – Site Access Control in High Risk and Conflict-Affected Settings. 112)
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7.3 SEPARATION OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
Bulk ammunition stocks should always be stored in a separate location to the weapon 
system they are designed to be fired from. The only time ammunition and weapon 
systems should be stored in the same place is when operational circumstances 
demand that weapons and ammunition be stored together, or ammunition is stored 
on operational vehicles. No single person should be able to gain unauthorised or 
unsupervised access to both weapons and ammunition.
For sub units and guardrooms, separate lockable storage should be provided for small 
arms and small arms ammunition. The IATG provides comprehensive guidelines on 
small unit ammunition storage. 113) It is recommended that only the minimum quantity 
of ammunition necessary to meet immediate operations is stored in such conditions. 
Where shift changeovers mandate multiple personnel having access to weapons 
and ammunition, then security checks should be conducted at a suitable frequency 
to identify loss and discourage diversion. Small arms ammunition should generally 
not be stored in weapon magazines for long periods of time. Where possible, ready 
use ammunition should be stored in its sealed original factory packaging.
Weapon systems which are particularly prone to diversion include man portable 
anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) and man portable air defence systems (MANPADS), 
so these should have their firing units or grip stocks stored in separate locations. 
Any ammunition nature which is deemed particularly attractive to criminal or terrorist 
organizations (ACTO) should be subject to more frequent checks. In conflict-affected 
environments, particularly where extremist groups are making use of IEDs, all 
ammunition natures containing HE or fragmentation warheads should be considered 
vulnerable to illicit diversion and protected accordingly.
If ammunition is required to be removed from its outer packaging and stored on 
operational vehicles, then all packaging should be retained to facilitate the safe 
unloading and return to storage at the end of the operational period.
7.4  SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND  
LOW-CAPACITY SETTINGS
Locks
Locks represent a part of many access control systems for ammunition facilities. High 
security locks and padlocks are expensive and may not be available in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments. Furthermore in tropical conditions, locks deteriorate 
very quickly and require regular replacement. Another issue with the use of locks and 
padlocks is that key control is essential to the maintenance of security. If duplicate 
keys are obtained then unauthorized and undetected access to ammunition may 
become possible. Control of keys is important and is covered in the IATG. 114)
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One possible low-technology approach to securing buildings which contain am-
munition is to use single-use numbered seals on doors. These seals are used 
frequently in the international logistics domain to identify if shipping containers 
are tampered with during transit. Their use in ammunition storage facilities, in 
conjunction with any form of lock or padlock, provides a quick and easy means of 
determining whether unauthorised access has been gained to an ESH. An example 
of a non-reusable security seal is shown in Figure 28. Where locks without seals 
are used then robust methods should be adopted for the control of keys and the 
auditing of access to ESHs.
Figure 28 – Non-Reusable Security Seals.
Use of Electronic Surveillance Systems
The use of electronic surveillance and intrusion detection systems (IDS) is problematic 
in most conflict-affected and low-capacity environments. Modern electronic systems 
tend not to be very reliable in harsh climates and require frequent maintenance 
to remain serviceable. Electronic surveillance systems should only be employed 
in circumstances where there is the capability to support and maintain them and 
there are sufficient resources to cover operational running costs.
Electronic surveillance systems and IDS are only appropriate if backed up by a 
suitable responsive and equipped quick reaction force (QRF). The response time of 
the QRF must be quicker than the assessed time for an intruder to penetrate the 
perimeter security measures and gain access to ammunition in an ESH.
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7.5 PREVENTION OF DIVERSION
Ammunition Attractive to Criminal and Terrorist Organizations (ACTO)
Some ammunition natures are more desirable than others for terrorist and criminal 
organisations and are more likely to be stolen or diverted. The IATG defines a 
number of ACTO categories 115) and these ammunition natures should never be 
stored in open stacks, and should always be stored in robust and locked ESHs. It 
is recommended that ACTO items are subject to stocktake and audit at a greater 
frequency than other types of ammunition.
In some conflict-affected environments, particularly where violent extremists are 
employing IEDs, the ACTO ammunition category may be quite broad and include 
all ammunition natures containing bulk HE which could be incorporated into an IED 
main charge. Generally, those ammunition natures most susceptible to diversion 
should be stored in the most secure ESHs which are available.
Supervision of Personnel
Adequate supervision of personnel is essential in reducing the risk of illicit diversion 
of ammunition. Two-person control over access to ESH keys and mandatory ‘no lone’ 
zones within ammunition storage and processing areas reduces the opportunity 
for a single person gaining access to ammunition and the creation of opportunities 
for diversion. It does not preclude two or more persons from conspiring to gain 
access to ammunition, but it does remove the opportunity for clandestine attack 
or illicit removal of ammunition by a person operating alone.
Random Searching of Vehicles and Personnel Leaving Sites
The random searching of personnel and vehicles leaving an ammunition site is an 
effective method of deterring the illicit removal of ammunition.
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This section contains guidance additional to the IATG based on good practices on  
the ground.
8.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE HAZARD CLASSIFICATION OF AMMUNITION
The UN system of hazardous goods classification is described in the IATG. 116) Where 
possible ammunition should be marked with an HCC derived from testing conducted 
by a competent national authority. With few exceptions, the international transport 
of ammunition requires packages to be formally certified and appropriately marked. 117) 
The remainder of this section describes a method by which a temporary HCC may 
be assigned to unclassified ammunition in order to mitigate explosive safety risks 
of ammunition in storage. The classification of ammunition i.e. determining its hazard 
division and compatibility group is fundamental to ensuring safety during transport 
and storage.
8.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Ammunition that has not been formally tested by a competent authority poses 
the unique challenge of classification. Figure 29 shows an example of ammunition 
packages not marked in accordance with the UN system at a storage site in North 
Africa.
Figure 29 – Example of Non-UN Classified Ammunition in North Africa. 118)
| 82
08
 —
 M
an
ag
in
g 
U
nc
la
ss
ifi
ed
 A
m
m
un
iti
on
Most countries have now adopted, or have plans to adopt, the GHS for the classification, 
labelling and packaging of dangerous goods and, over time, new ammunition will 
appear with the appropriate markings on its packaging. There are however very 
large quantities of ammunition now in storage that does not bear appropriate 
markings and this section provides advice on how this issue could be addressed. 
It will probably take many years for the legacy of unclassified ammunition to be 
adequately addressed.
8.3 METHODOLOGY OF ASSESSMENT
Where possible, the classification of a packaged ammunition item should be based on 
empirical data derived from testing directed by a competent national authority.
It is possible to draw meaningful conclusions, by analogy, from classification tests 
conducted on similar natures with identical explosive compositions. Caution should 
be exercised if the ammunition packaging is significantly different, particularly if 
the nature being assessed is now packaged in a container of a more combustible 
nature and is likely to be degraded quickly by fire.
Where test data is not available, or it is not possible to assign an interim classification 
by analogy, then it will require the technical judgement of an appropriately competent 
person to assess the hazard division of the item and determine its interim hazard 
classification. Where there is any doubt in the classification of an item, then the 
higher, or most hazardous classification, should be adopted.
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8.4 ASSESSING HAZARD DIVISION
It is recommended that unclassified ammunition is assigned an interim classification 
based on the hazard divisions shown in Table 2.
Table 2 – Interim Hazard Classification of Ammunition.
Hazard 
Division
Description Pictogram for 
Ammunition  
Packages
Fire Division Symbol 
for Explosive Store 
Houses
1.1 Ammunition that has a 
mass explosion hazard
1.2 Ammunition that has a 
projection hazard but not 
a mass explosion hazard
1.3 Ammunition that has a 
fire hazard and either a 
minor blast hazard or a 
minor projection hazard, 
or both, but not a mass 
explosion hazard
1.4 Ammunition that 
presents no significant 
hazard
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Criteria for Assigning Interim Hazard Division 1.1
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim hazard 
division of 1.1 :
• HE filled aircraft bombs ;
• HE filled shells with a calibre greater than 76 mm ;
• Bulk demolition explosives, detonators, boosters and detonating cords ;
• Anti-tank mines ;
• Specialist combat engineer munitions, such as line clearance charges ;
• HE filled mortar bombs with a calibre greater than 82 mm ;
• High-energy tank propelling charges (i.e. those with a mass explosive hazard) ;
• Free flight rockets with a calibre of 100 mm or greater, fitted with a unitary HE 
warhead ;
• Air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles fitted with a HE warhead ;
• Anti-ship missiles ;
• Torpedoes fitted with a high-explosive warhead ;
• Anti-submarine depth charges ;
• Anti-ship and anti-submarine mines.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Hazard Division 1.2
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim hazard 
division of 1.2 :
• Rocket propelled grenades contained within substantial wooden or metal 
packaging ;
• HE filled grenades contained within substantial wooden or metal packaging ;
• All non-HE filled mortar ammunition ;
• HE filled mortar bombs with a calibre of 82 mm or less contained within substantial 
wooden or metal packaging ;
• Man-portable anti-tank guided missiles contained within substantial wooden 
or metal packaging ;
• Man-portable surface to air missiles contained within substantial wooden or metal 
packaging ;
• Pyrotechnic rockets and flares ;
• Rifle grenades ;
• High-explosive cannon ammunition with a calibre of 57 mm, or less ;
• Free flight rockets with a calibre of 100 mm or greater that are fitted with cluster 
munition or scatterable mine warheads.
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Criteria for Assigning Interim Hazard Division 1.3
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim hazard 
division of 1.3 :
• Artillery propelling charges (but not charges contained within the same package 
or container as HE shell) ;
• Tank propelling charges (but not charges contained within the same package or 
container as HE shell, or containing a high-energy propellant posing a mass 
detonation hazard) ;
• Non-HE cannon ammunition with a calibre of 57 mm or less ;
• Large pyrotechnic items such as aircraft flares, vehicle screening and incendiary 
devices ;
• Small arms ammunition with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Hazard Division 1.4
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim hazard 
division of 1.4 :
• All small arms ammunition with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less ;
• Small pyrotechnic items such as mini-flares and smoke screening grenades (but 
not those filled with white or red phosphorous).
8.5 ASSESSING COMPATIBILITY GROUP
A suitably qualified and experienced ammunition practitioner is able to assess a 
particular ammunition nature and assign it to one of the compatibility groups detailed 
in the IATG. 119) It is recommended that only a subset of compatibility groups is used 
for interim consideration and that this is : B, C, D, E, F, G, H and S.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group B
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of B :
• Fuzes and initiators containing primary explosives ;
• Electric and plain detonators.
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Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group C
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of C :
• Artillery propelling charges (but not charges contained within the same package 
or container as HE shell) ;
• Tank propelling charges (but not charges contained within the same package or 
container as HE shell, or containing a high-energy propellant posing a mass 
detonation hazard) ;
• Non-HE cannon ammunition with a calibre of 57 mm or less ;
• Small arms ammunition with a calibre greater than 7.62 mm.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group D
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of D :
• HE filled aircraft bombs not fitted with a fuze ;
• HE filled shells not fitted with a fuze (but not those packaged with a propelling 
charge) ;
• Bulk demolition explosives, detonators, boosters and detonating cords ;
• Anti-tank mines not fitted with a fuze ;
• High-energy tank propelling charges (i.e. those with a mass explosive hazard) ;
• Anti-submarine depth charges not fitted with a fuze ;
• Anti-ship and anti-submarine mines not fitted with a fuze.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group E
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of E (see note below on assigning interim compatibility group F) :
• HE filled shells in the same package as a propelling charge ;
• Specialist combat engineer munitions, such as line clearance charges ;
• HE filled mortar bombs ;
• HE filled tank ammunition in the same package as a propelling charge ;
• Free flight rockets with a calibre of 100 mm or greater, fitted with a unitary HE 
warhead ;
• Air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles fitted with a HE warhead (but not missiles 
with liquid propellants) ;
• Anti-ship missiles (but not missiles with liquid propellants).
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Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group F
Assessing munitions for interim compatibility group F is potentially problematic. 
Any munition which contains a secondary detonating explosive and a propelling 
charge and its own means of initiation should be considered as compatibility group F. 
However, many fuzes and initiators which are fitted to shells, missile warheads and 
cannon ammunition are considered to possess multiple safety features in order that 
they and the parent munition to which they are affixed is allocated compatibility 
group E rather than F. In assessing the safety features present in a fuze consideration 
should be given, if known, as to whether the detonator is in an ‘in-line’ or ‘out of line’ 
configuration in the unfired munition. ‘Out of line’ configurations are generally 
considered safer. Assessing fuze design on recovered munitions is difficult and in 
the absence of published safety or design data. In the event of uncertainty, munitions 
should be assessed as compatibility group F.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group G
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of G :
• Large pyrotechnic items such as aircraft flares, vehicle screening and incendiary 
devices ;
• Small pyrotechnic items such as mini-flares and smoke screening grenades (but 
not those filled with white or red phosphorous).
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group H
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of H :
• All tank, artillery and mortar ammunition containing WP ;
• All hand and vehicle screening grenades containing WP.
Criteria for Assigning Interim Compatibility Group S
The following ammunition types could generally be assigned an interim compatibility 
group of S :
• All small arms ammunition with a calibre of 7.62 mm or less which is contained 
within substantial metal or wooden packaging ;
• Ammunition items with an extremely small NEQ not containing a detonating 
substance contained within substantial metal or wooden packaging e.g. igniters, 
initiators.
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8.6 MARKING OF AMMUNITION PACKAGES
Ammunition packaging forms an important part of an effective ammunition safety 
management system. Ammunition packages may be encountered which are poorly 
or incorrectly marked. 120) It is strongly recommended that states classify ammunition 
in accordance with UN guidelines and best international practice. 121) It is suggested 
that all ammunition packages be marked with at least the following information :
• Hazard classification code ;
• Nature or designation of ammunition item ;
• Quantity contained within the package ;
• Lot or batch number.
Package markings may be applied at the individual package level or at the pallet level 
for ammunition natures that are palletized. The condition of ammunition packaging has 
a critical role to play in maintaining the safety and integrity of the ammunition nature.
8.7 MANAGEMENT OF RECOVERED AND CAPTURED AMMUNITION
Overview of the Problem
Recovered or captured ammunition, including from disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR) programmes, presents a number of issues for authorities :
• The provenance of the ammunition is usually completely unknown ;
• There is usually limited or no technical data on the design, explosive compositions, 
and NEQ of the nature ;
• The method of operation of the safety and arming of any fuzing or initiation 
system may not be known ;
• The ammunition natures may be : unpackaged, stored in non-original packaging, 
or mixed with other potentially incompatible natures.
Safety Considerations for Recovered and Captured Ammunition
Safety is the primary consideration when handling recovered or captured ammuni-
tion and it is essential that personnel with both appropriate ammunition technical 
competences and the necessary explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) skills are used 
to assess recovered or captured munitions. Figure 30 provides an indication of the 
technical complexity that may be faced when dealing with recovered or captured 
ammunition. In this example a large number of differing ammunition natures, some 
unpackaged and some in a dangerously exposed condition, were identified at a 
site in central Africa.
Before any large-scale interventions are considered on recovered or captured 
ammunition, it is essential that a safe area for a CDS is established.
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The following issues may be encountered with recovered or captured ammunition :
• It may be poorly or incorrectly packaged ;
• It may have been prepared for firing and safety pins or other safety related 
devices may have been removed ;
• It may have been fired and returned incorrectly to store, in effect forming a 
UXO hazard ;
• Incompatible ammunition natures may be stored together ;
• Energetic compositions may be hazardous due to age or poor environmental 
storage.
Figure 30 – Recovered Ammunition at a Collection Site in Central Africa. 122)
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People form an essential element in all safety management systems and this is 
particularly true of ammunition safety management. It is important that training 
is closely related to and based on the national approach to ammunition safety 
management.
In conflict-affected and low-capacity environments training is often delivered in an 
adhoc fashion without significant thought given to the development of long-term 
structures and national capabilities. It is suggested that a systems approach to 
training (SAT) is adopted and that where national ammunition technical guidelines 
are not present, the national ammunition safety management system is based 
on the IATG.
The IATG training courses developed by the UN SaferGuard Programme are fully 
compliant with SAT and form an excellent basis on which broader ammunition 
management and technical competences could be developed in conflict-affected 
and low-capacity environments.
9.1 CORE AMMUNITION TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT COMPETENCES
The IATG makes the following comments regarding developing the competences 
of personnel involved in the operation and management of ammunition storage 
and processing facilities 123) :
The nature of ammunition and explosives with their potential for unplanned, 
violent reaction makes it necessary to develop recommendations and guidelines 
for safe conventional ammunition management stockpile management. The 
effective implementation of the IATG requires well-trained and educated 
individuals with specialist knowledge. There are no international standards that 
lay down exactly what competences are required for the various roles within an 
ammunition management system.
A fundamental element of any safe system of work is that activities are conducted 
by appropriately trained and competent personnel. The term ‘competence’ refers 
to the ability of an individual to do the job properly and the term ‘competency’ 
refers to the related knowledge, skills, abilities, attributes and behavioural traits 
of an individual.
The IATG suggests that a functional approach should be taken and the key functional 
ammunition management roles are defined as follows 124) :
• Ammunition Operator. Assist in the handling and movement of ammunition and 
explosive substances and articles during issue, receipt, storage and distribution.
• Ammunition Accountant. Accurately account for ammunition and explosive 
substances and articles.
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• Ammunition Supervisor. Supervise the issue, receipt, storage, distribution and 
maintenance and disposal of ammunition and explosive substances and articles.
• Ammunition Manager. Manage the storage, issue, receipt, distribution, main-
tenance and stockpile management of ammunition and explosive substances 
and articles.
• Ammunition Processor. Inspect, maintain and repair ammunition or other 
explosive substances and articles.
• Ammunition Inspector. Develop, implement and audit the policy and technical 
instructions for all aspects of the stockpile management of ammunition and 
explosive substances and articles.
• Ammunition Regulator. Develop national policy and technical instructions for all 
aspects of the stockpile management of ammunition and explosive substances 
and articles.
For conflict-affected and low-capacity environments the acquisition of sufficient 
technical and management competences to implement an ammunition management 
and safety system can be daunting. It is recommended that training is delivered in-
crementally and that it should be in accordance with the UN SaferGuard Programme 
raining courses on the IATG, which is covered in greater detail in the next section.
9.2  AMMUNITION TECHNICAL AND AMMUNITION SAFETY  
MANAGEMENT TRAINING
National Defence Policy Drivers for Training
There are a variety of models that can be adopted to provide effective training for 
the personnel that are involved in the management, receipt, processing, preparation 
for firing, and issuing of weapons and ammunition. Some armed forces have 
adopted an almost entirely joint approach 125) to the training of their armaments 
engineering officers and technicians. The advantages of this approach are that it 
allows for national training resources to be focused on specific requirements and 
economies of scale may be achieved through delivery of training to a larger pool 
of individuals. The joint approach also helps foster inter-service cooperation. The 
principal disadvantage of joint training is that it requires a broader range of training 
to be delivered to all personnel, which increases cost. It also requires purely single 
service training to be still delivered on a single service basis i.e. there is little point 
in training naval weapon engineering technicians on land force systems, or for 
training land armaments engineering technicians on naval systems.
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Some armed forces deliver training purely on a single service basis. The advantage of 
this approach is that it allows training to be specifically tailored to the requirements of 
the individual service, the principal disadvantage is unnecessary duplication of basic 
level training across a number of separate services with consequent cost implications.
Training Syllabus and National Policies
International training is delivered by a number of states, often on a bilateral basis. In 
order to achieve consistency of approach it is strongly recommended that all donor 
funded ammunition technical and management training is delivered in accordance 
with the IATG, in preference to individual national standards.
9.3 UN SAFERGUARD PROGRAMME TRAINING COURSES ON THE IATG
UNODA provides web-based, publicly accessible training material. 126) This training 
should be delivered by appropriately qualified and competent instructors as defined 
by UNODA. The UN SaferGuard training described below provides satisfactory 
training to fully cover the functions of the Ammunition Operator, Ammunition 
Accountant and covers most of the non-technical functions of the Ammunition 
Supervisor and Ammunition Manager. Further details on the UNODA courses, 
which are particularly relevant for conflict-affected and low-capacity environments, 
are shown below :
Small Unit Ammunition Stockpile Management
The aim of the Small Unit and Ammunition Stockpile Management Course is to 
introduce Police, Military, Customs and Border Guard staff as to the specific require-
ments of the IATG for the safe, effective and efficient storage and handling of 
ammunition and explosive at the small unit level. 127)
Small unit ammunition storage is considered to cover the storage of relatively small 
quantities of primarily hazard division 1.4 in military units and police stations, although 
the requirements for small quantities of hazard divisions 1.1 to 1.3 are included. It 
does not cover the storage requirements for large quantities of ammunition of hazard 
divisions 1.1 to 1.3 at the logistic level in ammunition depots.
The course is only designed to introduce and explain the basic requirements of 
the IATG for small unit ammunition storage. It does not qualify individuals as being 
competent as Ammunition Specialists.
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Military Ammunition Stockpile Management
The aim of the Military Ammunition Stockpile Management Course is to introduce 
Police, Military, Customs and Border Guard staff as to the specific requirements of 
the IATG for the safe, effective and efficient storage and handling of ammunition 
and explosive at the logistic / ammunition depot level.
The course is only designed to introduce and explain the basic requirements of 
the IATG for ammunition stockpile management at the logistic level in ammunition 
depots. It does not qualify individuals as being competent as Ammunition Specialists.
Ammunition Accounting and Tracing
The aim of the Ammunition Accounting and Tracing Course is to introduce Civil Service, 
Diplomatic, Police, Military, Customs and Border Guard staff to the appropriate 
techniques for ammunition accounting and tracing in accordance with the IATG 
and other international agreements.
9.4  ADDRESSING THE AMMUNITION TECHNICAL COMPETENCE 
SHORTFALLS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND LOW-CAPACITY SETTINGS
Ammunition Technical Competence Gaps
The following are the critical ammunition technical competence gaps which need 
to be addressed in order to establish safe systems of work. They are particularly 
relevant in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments, where captured or 
recovered ammunition may be present and the overall stockpile may be of unknown 
technical provenance.
Ammunition Processing
The Ammunition Processor requires the technical competence to conduct the 
following ammunition processing operations :
• Inspection of Ammunition. Ammunition inspection 128) competences include :
• Confirmation of the physical condition and quantity of ammunition within an 
ammunition package and confirmation that the items is stored in approved 
service packaging ;
• A visual examination to confirm whether ammunition which has been issued 
to training or operations and the package have been opened are still fit for use ;
• Visual detection of signs of corrosion or other deterioration which may indicate 
the requirement for future ammunition repair tasks or the ammunition nature 
is deteriorating to the extent that it will soon be unusable and require disposal.
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• Breakdown of Ammunition. It may often be necessary to breakdown ammu-
nition items as part of a broader ammunition disposal task. The breakdown of 
ammunition is inherently more hazardous than the inspection of ammunition 
because explosive fillings are often exposed during the process. There may also 
be particular hazards associated with the removal of items such as fixed fuzes 
which mandate the use of remotely operated equipment.
• Ammunition Packaging. Ammunition packaging forms an important part of 
an effective ammunition safety management system. It is often necessary for 
ammunition to be re-packed or broken down into fraction packs before it is issued.
Ammunition processing is often also associated with ammunition repair and sur-
veillance. It is considered that both activities are unlikely to be achievable in most 
conflict-affected and low-capacity environments.
Ammunition Inspector/Manager
Personnel involved in the oversight and technical management of ammunition 
require to have a more detailed technical understanding of the ammunition natures 
which stored or processed in order that they can satisfactorily identify hazards and 
manage risks. The level of technical training required depends largely on the com-
plexity of the munitions which are being stored. Simple natures, such as small 
arms ammunition require little additional technical training. More complex natures, 
such as surface-to-air missiles 129) or most modern sea or air-delivered munitions, 
require a significant level of technical training if they are to be stored and processed 
safely.
Using a Systems Approach to Training
A variety of methodologies and models are available and a generic approach that 
has been adopted by many armed forces is based on the ADDIE model 130) and this 
has been further refined into a systems-based approach to training. The advantages 
of using a systematic approach to training development are that it ensures that a 
rigorous review of requirements is undertaken and scarce resources are employed 
efficiently. The SAT is shown in the process diagram at Figure 31.
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Figure 31 – Overview of the Systems Approach to Training.
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The ISO Guidelines for Training articulate a four-stage process for training : defining 
training needs ; designing and planning training ; providing for the training ; and 
evaluating the outcome of training. 131)
9.5 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TRAINING
Requirement for EOD Training
The ability to destroy unsafe or unserviceable ammunition is a fundamental capability 
required by all facilities which store and process ammunition
EOD is covered in the IATG in the context of the demilitarization and destruction 
of ammunition 132) and in dealing with ASA explosions. 133) EOD competences and 
qualifications are not generally covered in the IATG and other international or national 
references should be consulted 134)  135). The most recent definition of recognized 
international EOD training competences is contained within International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). 136)
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A prerequisite for the safe conduct of EOD within the confines of an ammunition 
storage and processing facility is the establishment of a safe CDS for the safe 
disposal of ammunition by OB or OD. The types and size of munitions to be disposed 
of will determine the detailed safety requirements relating to the planning and 
implementation of a CDS. It is essential that this informed by a person with suitable 
ammunition technical competences who is aware of the hazards associated with 
the munitions which are planned to be destroyed.
Application of IMAS EOD Training Levels
Given the complexity of most OB / OD ammunition disposal tasks, it is only IMAS  
Level 3, with specific training on logistic demolitions, which is appropriate for  
personnel concerned with ammunition destruction tasks at ammunition storage and 
processing facilities.
IMAS training levels are designed to be progressive in order to aid training and 
development of personnel.
• IMAS Level 1. The IMAS Level 1 EOD qualification enables the trained holder 
of the qualification, under supervision, to locate, expose and to destroy in situ, 
when possible, single items of mines and specific ERW on which the individual 
has been trained.
• IMAS Level 2. In addition to the competences at Level 1, the IMAS Level 2 EOD 
qualification enables the holder to determine when it is safe to move and transport 
munitions and to conduct the simultaneous disposal of multiple items of ordnance 
using line mains or ring mains. This qualification extends only to those mines 
and specific ERW on which the individual has been trained.
• IMAS Level 3. In addition to the competences at Level 1 and 2, the IMAS 
Level 3 EOD qualification enables the holder to conduct render-safe procedures 
and final disposal of a wide range of specific types of explosive ordnance on 
which the individual has been trained ; and, with further training may include :
• Clearance of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) ;
• Handling and disposal of depleted uranium EO and related hazards ;
• Handling and disposal of fired and unfired guided weapons ;
• Intact cluster munitions ;
• Underwater EOD.
The key to delivering effective EOD training is the identification and selection of 
personnel with the right temperament and technical suitability to conduct EOD 
operations. The most effective forms of EOD training are delivered progressively, 
whereby periods of technical EOD training are interspersed with practical experience.
10
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10.1  WHY INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED IN 
CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND LOW-CAPACITY SETTINGS
International stakeholders and donors have an important role to play in developing 
ammunition management capabilities in conflict-affected and low-capacity environ-
ments. The most common reasons for states in conflict-affected and low-capacity 
settings requiring international assistance are due to : a lack of national resources 
to fund the project from national resources ; a lack of technical skills to complete 
the project using the state’s own armed forces ; and in post-conflict situations there 
may be an urgent requirement to manage recovered ammunition.
Resource Constraints
Insufficient resources, capacity, and knowledge are the primary reasons why many 
states in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments are unable to conduct 
ammunition safety management projects using their own resources. Government 
officials with no experience of UEMS will often assign a low priority to ammunition 
projects when compared to other pressing demands on national budgets. Interna-
tional stakeholders are often better placed to prioritize donor funding for ammunition 
safety management projects than national entities. In conflict-affected settings, 
it is often the UN or regional peacekeeping force which can identify ammunition 
safety issues which require addressing as a matter of urgency.
One of the aims of any development project should be to build long-term national 
capabilities. It is therefore essential that any projects which are delivered using 
donor funding do not impose long-term operating cost expenditure on the recipient 
state. All projects should also be logistically sustainable using national resources 
and capacities and not require additional downstream international sup-+port in 
terms of equipment support expertise or replacement parts.
Lack of National Technical Capability
A lack of indigenous capabilities is a very common reason for projects being delivered 
through international donors ; any training which is delivered as part of the project 
must be tailored to the operating environment and be specific to the recipient state’s 
needs.
Recovery from Conflict
States recovering from conflict may have limited national and regional government 
institutions to address issues relating to weapons and ammunition management. If 
the conflict has resulted in the centralization and collection of weapons, there is likely 
to be substantial quantities of ammunition which are either unsafe or unserviceable 
and will require disposal. There may also be a requirement for international entities 
to assist in the clearance of ERW and UXO inside ASAs.
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10.2 ROLE OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
National authorities have an essential role to play in the implementation of effective 
ammunition management systems. In conflict-affected environments, where central 
government may be playing a minimal role, it is essential that steps are taken at 
the earliest opportunity to develop national ownership of ammunition management 
processes. It is a fundamental guiding principle of the IATG that national governments 
have the right to apply national standards to their national stockpile. 137)
National Co-ordination
The delivery ammunition management capability enhancements must be co-ordinated 
and to an agreed national plan. Donors should resist the temptation to deliver training 
and capability enhancements based on their own national processes and should 
engage with national and international stakeholders on delivering solutions which 
meet the specific needs of the recipient nation.
National Programme Considerations for donors ?
The following should be considered in evaluating assistance projects in the am-
munition domain :
• National policy (if it exists) ;
• Adherence with international best-practice i.e. are the ammunition management 
aspects of the project in accordance with the IATG ?
• Enduring benefits of the project if it is delivered i.e. will it contribute to increased 
public safety ?
• Does it promote or support long-term goals to help institutionalize national explosives 
safety and security standards ?
Where possible, assistance should be provided with a view to developing domestic 
standalone capabilities that are compatible with best international practice. Where 
no existing national regulatory or competence framework exists, it is strongly recom-
mended that the measures described in the IATG are adopted. The development of 
a national strategy or roadmap on ammunition management is also recommended, 
especially where there is the involvement of multiple international donors and a 
requirement to de-conflict projects, and to prevent the duplication of effort.
101 |
10
 —
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l C
o-
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
A
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
10.3 DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
Assistance in the development of ammunition processing and storage infrastructure 
is often a high-priority issue and can be addressed by donors through the imple-
mentation of discrete projects. The principal issues to be considered in developing 
ammunition storage and processing infrastructure were covered in Section 6 of this 
document. Where multiple projects are being delivered it is strongly recommended 
that a coordinating group be established to oversee the following :
• Specification of project requirements and constraints ;
• Oversight of project planning and the specification of key milestones ;
• Co-ordination of elements relating to the delivery of the project ;
• Project quality assurance ;
• Assistance in post-project evaluation.
The project to deliver an enhanced ammunition storage infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire 
in 2011 138) is a good example of a complex project implemented to meet an urgent 
operational need in a conflict-affected setting. Figure 32 shows newly constructed 
ESHs at Seguela. The projected was funded by the UNOCI DDR division, coordinated 
by UNMAS and delivered by an implementing partner, HALO Trust.
Figure 32 – Construction of New Ammunition Storage Infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire. 139)
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10.4 TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
Training of personnel is an important element of most capacity development projects 
in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments. Training is often funded by donors 
in connection with other ammunition capacity development projects, such as the 
upgrading or construction of physical infrastructure. In delivering ammunition 
training in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments, international donors and 
coordinating entities should consider the following :
• Is the training in accordance with national ammunition strategy, framework or 
roadmap ?
• Is the training pitched at a suitable level where it will be understood by the target 
audience ?
• Is the training part of an integrated package and is it compatible with the IATG ?
Training may be delivered in a variety of ways but on the ground practical training 
is invariably the most appropriate method for acquiring skills for those with a 
relatively low technical background. Higher level technical training is appropriate for 
those with the academic and language skills which will fulfil senior appointments 
in management and regulatory positions. This type of training is invariably best 
delivered ‘out of country’ at recognized centres of excellence.
10.5  ASSISTANCE WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF UNSAFE, OBSOLETE, 
UNSERVICEABLE OR SURPLUS AMMUNITION STOCK
The disposal of unsafe, obsolete or surplus ammunition is a key challenge and signifi-
cant effort is usually needed to convince states to regard surplus and unserviceable 
stock as liabilities rather than assets. The technical requirements for the large-scale 
logistic disposal of ammunition are very different to that of single item demolition 
of UXO. All EOD training is best delivered in stages with the initial priority being to 
establish safe explosive handling techniques. In low-capacity and conflict-affected 
environments it is very likely that EOD training will be required to be provided in 
conjunction with ammunition safety management training. Figure 33 shows a 
prepared multi-item demolition during training funded by international donors for 
a country in the Middle East.
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Figure 33 – Multi-Item Demolition Training. 140)
10.6 ASSISTANCE WITH THE SECURITY OF AMMUNITION STOCKPILES
The security of ammunition stockpiles is particularly important in conflict-affected 
environments because the availability of unsecured weapons and ammunition can 
act as an accelerant to armed conflict. In conflict-affected and post-conflict environments, 
where security is maintained by an international or regional peacekeeping force, then 
attention should be given to the following :
• Securing central weapons storage facilities and preventing the illicit diversion of 
weapons and ammunition ;
• Denying extremists access to ammunition natures containing bulk HE in order to 
limit IED proliferation ;
• Prioritized destruction of unsafe, obsolete, surplus and unserviceable ammunition ;
• If safe to do so, the movement of ammunition from locations where it poses an 
immediate risk to civilian personnel.
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ANNEX A : REFERENCE TO RELEVANT IATG MODULES
To better understand the relationship between each section of this support document 
and the IATG, this annex includes each relevant IATG module referenced in each 
section of the document Utilizing the IATG in Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity 
Environments :
Section 3. Context
• IATG 01.10 Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines 
(IATG) : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.10-Guide-to-IATG-V.2.pdf
• IATG 01.30 Policy Development and Advice :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf
• IATG 01.40 Glossary of Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.40-Glossary-and-Definitions-V.2.pdf
• IATG 01.90 Ammunition Management Personnel Competences :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-01.90-Personnel-Competences-V.2-rev.pdf
• IATG 02.10 Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-02-10-Introduction-to-Risk-Management-Principles-V.2.pdf
Section 4.  Improving Safety – Reducing the Risk of  
Accidental Explosions
• IATG 01.20 Index of Risk Reduction Process Levels (RRPL) within IATG : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.20-Index-of-Risk-Process-Levels-V.2.pdf
• IATG 01.50 UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.50-UN-Explosive-Classification-System-and-Codes-V.2.pdf
• IATG 01.80 Formulae for Ammunition Management :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-01.80-Formulae-for-Ammunition-Management-V.2.01.pdf
• IATG 01.90 Ammunition Management Personnel Competences : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-01.90-Personnel-Competences-V.2-rev.pdf
• IATG 02.10 Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-02-10-Introduction-to-Risk-Management-Principles-V.2.pdf
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• IATG 02.20 Quantity and Separation Distances :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-02-20-Quantity-and-Separation-Distances-V-2.pdf
• IATG 02.30 Licensing of Explosive Facilities : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/
unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-02.30-Licensing-of-ESA-V.2.pdf
• IATG 02.50 Fire Safety : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/IATG-02.50-Fire-Safety-V.2.pdf
• IATG 03.10 Inventory Management : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-03.10-Inventory-Management-V.2.pdf
• IATG 03.20 Lotting and Batching : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-03.20-Lotting-and-Batching-V.2.pdf
• IATG 03.30 International Transfer of Ammunition Module :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-03.30-International-Transfer-Module-V.2.pdf
• IATG 03.40 End-user and End-use of Internationally Transferred Ammunition 
Module : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-03.40-End-Use-Module-V.2.pdf
• IATG 03.50 Tracing of Ammunition : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-03.50-Tracing-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.20 Types of Buildings for Explosives Facilities :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-05.20-Types-of-Buildings-for-Explosives-Storage-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.30 Barricades : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/IATG-05.30-Barricades-V.21.pdf
• IATG 05.40 Safety Standards for Electrical Installations :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-05.40-Electrical-Installation-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.50 Vehicles and MHE in Explosives Facilities :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-05.50-MHE-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.60 Radio Frequency Hazards : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/
unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-05.60-RF-Hazards-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.10 Control of Explosives Facilities :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-06.10-Control-of-Explosives-Facilities-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.20 Storage Space Requirements :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-06.20-Storage-Space-Requirements-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.30 Storage and Handling : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-06.30-Storage-and-Handling-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.40 Ammunition Packaging and Marking :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-06.40-Packaging-and-Marking-V.2.pdf
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• IATG 06.80 Inspection of Ammunition :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ 
IATG-06.80-Inspection-of-Ammunition-V.2REV-cat-D3.pdf
• IATG 07.20 Surveillance and In-service Proof :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-07.20-Surveillance-and-In-Service-Proof-V.2.pdf
• IATG 10.10 Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-10.10-Demilitarization-and-Destruction-V.2.pdf
Section 5.  Mitigating and Managing the Effects of Accidental 
Explosions
• IATG 02.20 Quantity and Separation Distances :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-02-20-Quantity-and-Separation-Distances-V-2.pdf
• IATG 02.30 Licensing of Explosive Facilities : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/
unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IATG-02.30-Licensing-of-ESA-V.2.pdf
• IATG 02.40 Safeguarding of Explosive Facilities :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-02.40-Safeguarding-of-Explosive-Facilities-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.30 Barricades : https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/IATG-05.30-Barricades-V.21.pdf
• IATG 07.10 Safety and Risk Reduction (Ammunition Processing Operations) : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-07.10-Safety-and-Risk-Reduction-V-2.pdf
• IATG 09.10 Security Principles and Systems :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-09.10-Security-Principles-and-Systems-V.2.pdf
• IATG 11.30 Ammunition Storage Area Explosions - EOD Clearance : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-11.30-ASA-Explosions-EOD-Clearance-V.2.pdf
Section 6. Planning Considerations
• IATG 05.10 Planning and Siting of Explosives Facilities :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-05.10-Planning-and-Siting-Explosives-Facilities-V.2.pdf
• IATG 05.20 Types of Buildings for Explosives Facilities : 
 https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-05.20-Types-of-Buildings-for-Explosives-Storage-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.60 Work Services (Construction and Repair) :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-06.60-Works-Services-V.2.pdf
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Section 7.  Implementing Effective Security Measures and  
Preventing Stock Diversion
• IATG 09.10 Security Principles and Systems :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-09.10-Security-Principles-and-Systems-V.2.pdf
Section 8. Managing Unclassified Ammunition
• IATG 01.50 UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes : 
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.50-UN-Explosive-Classification-System-and-Codes-V.2.pdf
• IATG 06.40 Ammunition Packaging and Marking :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-06.40-Packaging-and-Marking-V.2.pdf
Section 9. Training and Competence Development
• IATG 01.90 Ammunition Management Personnel Competences :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-01.90-Personnel-Competences-V.2-rev.pdf
• IATG 06.80 Inspection of Ammunition : 
 https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ 
IATG-06.80-Inspection-of-Ammunition-V.2REV-cat-D3.pdf
• IATG 12.20 Small Unit Ammunition Storage :  
https ://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-12.20-Small-Unit-Ammunition-Storage-V.2.pdf
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 1) Photo : British Army Principal Ammunition Technical Officer, 2009.
 2) Small Arms Survey, updated February 2018 with data covering the period  
January 1979 to February 2018,
 3) Cyprus Accident Part 2, presentation by Dr Michael Sharp, Emmanuel Schultz and 
Thomas Taylor, NATO MSIAC, at the Australian Defence Force Explosive Safety 
Symposium (Parari), 2013.
 4) The term ammunition nature is used to specify a generic type of ammunition and 
encompasses all explosive items required to form a fireable load ; for example for 
artillery ammunition, it includes the propelling charge, igniter, shell and fuze.
 5) Small Arms and Light Weapons Report of the Secretary General, S/2017/1025, 
UNSC, 6 December 2017.
 6) Diversion Digest, Conflict Armament Research, 1 August 2018.
 7) Photo : MSGT J Bowman, United States Air Force, released under  
DF-SD-OF-02188 dated 22 August 2003.
 8) In this context ‘unclassified’ means ammunition which has not been tested 
or assessed by a competent body for the purposes of evaluating its hazard 
classification code.
 9) See UNIDIR WAM documentation here http://www.unidir.ch/publications
 10) IATG 01.10 Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), 
second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 11) IATG 01.30 Policy development and advice (IATG), second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 12) The lack of provenance and an absence of hazard classification data is a particular 
problem associated with captured ammunition.
 13) The concept of safeguarding i.e. ensuring inhabited buildings or other vulnerable 
structures are not constructed within the area hazarded by an ammunition site is 
covered later in this document.
 14) The development of the structural element and the importance of national 
ownership is covered in : A Practical Guide to Life-cycle Management of 
Ammunition, Section 2.6.1, Carapic, Deschambault, Holtom and King,  
Small Arms Survey, April 2018
 15) IATG 01.90 Ammunition management personnel competences, second edition, 
UNODA, 2015.
 16) Op Cit Small Arms Survey, 2018.
 17) Weapons of the Islamic State, Conflict Armament Research, December 2017.
 18) General and complete disarmament : problems arising from the accumulation of 
conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, UNGA Resolution 72/55,  
document A/C.1/72/L.43, 12 October 2017.
 19) Effective Control of Explosive Ordnance – A Critical Factor in Upstream IED 
Proliferation – Lessons Learned in Libya, a paper by Bob Seddon, Paul Grimsley 
and Lance Malin presented at the Meeting of National Mine Action Programme 
Directors and UN Advisors, 15 February 2018.
 20) SVBIED intercepted at a checkpoint in the vicinity of Abugrein by Libyan Security 
Force personnel and rendered safe by a Libyan Police/MOI IEDD team on  
11 January 2018. Photo : Libyan MOI.
 21) IATG 02.10 Introduction to risk management principles and processes,  
second edition, UNODA, 2015
 22) IATG 01.40 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations, second edition, 
UNODA, 2015.
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 23) IATG 02.10 Introduction to risk management principles and processes,  
second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 24) IATG 02.30 Licensing of explosive facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 25) Op Cit IATG 02.10 Annex G.
 26) IATG 02.30 Licensing of explosive facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 27) At present, the Toolkit can only be accessed via internet, which could be a 
constraining limitation in low-capacity and conflict-affected settings
 28) Calculations in these tools are based on : IATG 01.80 Formulae for ammunition 
management and IATG 02.20 Quantity and separation distances, second edition, 
UNODA, 2015.
 29) https ://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/explosion-consequence-analysis/
 30) The ECA provides an assessment of the effects of blast, but not primary or 
secondary fragmentation resulting from an explosion.
 31) https ://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/map/
 32) https ://webwiser.nlm.nih.gov/getHomeData.do WISER is also available for 
standalone PCs and a variety of mobile platforms.
 33) https ://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/risk-reduction-process-levels/
 34) IATG 03.10 Inventory management, second edition, UNODA, 2015 and IATG 06.20 
Storage space requirements, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 35) IATG 02.30 Licensing of explosive facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 36) IATG 01.50 UN explosive hazard classification system and codes, second edition, 
UNODA, 2015 and this subject is covered in greater detail in Section 8 of  
this document.
 37) IATG 03.10 Inventory management, second edition, UNODA, 2015 and IATG 06.20 
Storage space requirements, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 38) Ammunition accounting is covered in several IATG including : 03.10 Inventory 
management ; 03.20 Lotting and batching ; 03.30 International transfer of 
ammunition ; 03.40 End-user and end-use of internationally transferred ammunition ; 
03.50 Tracing of ammunition ; UNODA, 2015.
 39) IATG 06.30 Storage and handling, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 40) IATG 05.50 Vehicles and mechanical handling equipment (MHE) in explosives 
facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 41) IATG 06.30 Storage and handling, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 42) In tropical conditions pallets and wooden boxes should be treated with an 
appropriate insecticide to prevent damage from wood boring insects. In the past, 
pentachlorophenol (PCP) was used to preserve wood used for the manufacture of 
ammunition boxes and pallets ; this material though poses a potential long-term 
toxic hazard and necessitates disposal as hazardous waste.
 43) Photo : UNMAS, 2012.
 44) IATG 05.20 Types of buildings for explosive facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 45) IATG 06.40 Ammunition packaging and marking, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 46) IATG 06.50 Specific safety precautions (storage and operations), second edition, 
UNODA, 2015.
 47) IATG 06.30 Storage and handling, second edition, UNODA, 2015
 48) IATG 06.10 Control of explosives facilities, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 49) Op Cit IATG 06.50 Section 10.
 50) Photo : Samuel Paunila, 2016.
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 51) The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals 
(GHS) is an internationally agreed upon standard managed by the UN. It provides 
standardized testing criteria, universal warning symbols, and harmonized safety 
data sheets. The GHS complements the UN Numbered system of regulated 
hazardous material transport. GHS implementation is managed through the  
UN Secretariat and has been enacted in EU law under the Classification,  
Labelling and Packaging (CLP) regulations and in the US under Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) standards.
 52) IATG 01.50, UN explosive hazard classification system, second edition,  
UNODA, 2015.
 53) The pictograms in this table adhere to the Classification, Labelling and Packaging 
(CLP) Regulation (EC No 1272/2008) and is based on the UN GHS.
 54) Op Cit IATG 01.50 Section 7.1.
 55) A certain degree of segregation in storage may be achieved by interposing small 
arms ammunition with a hazard classification of 1.4S between other natures which 
may be incompatible in storage.
 56) Recovered or captured ammunition often presents safety issues due to its unknown 
provenance. Often captured ammunition is unpackaged, or poorly packaged 
thus representing a significant challenge in determining the appropriate hazard 
classification code.
 57) White Phosphorus (WP) melts at 44 ̊ C, a temperature often reached inside ESHs 
in hot-dry and tropical areas of the world. In liquid form, WP can migrate through 
fuze wells and fuze or plug threads and spontaneously ignite on contact with air.  
It is for this reason, where possible, that plugged or fuzed WP filled ammunition 
items should be stored with the plug or fuze uppermost.
 58) Op Cit IATG 06.30 Section 5.5.3.
 59) Op Cit IATG 01.50 Section 7.1.
 60) Photo : KF Armory, www.kfarmory.com 2018.
 61) Photo : Canadian DoD, 2010.
 62) IATG 05.30 Barricades, para 9.2.1, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 63) The compatibility group of a given ammunition nature is highly dependent on the 
type and configuration of packaging. It is possible to procure detonators with 
packaging with a hazard division of 1.4 i.e. presenting no significant hazard. Where 
segregated or separate ammunition storage is at a premium, consideration should 
be given to procuring detonators with a 1.4 hazard division.
 64) IATG 02.50 Fire safety, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 65) IATG 05.60 Radio frequency hazards, second edition, UNODA, 2015.
 66) IATG 02.50, Fire safety, UNODA, 2015.
 67) Open stacked ammunition poses the greatest fire vulnerability and ammunition 
which is easy to ignite, such as that contained within wooden packaging or natures 
containing explosive materials with a low ignition temperature, such as propellants, 
should not generally be stored in open stacks.
 68) IATG 05.40 Safety standards for electrical installations, Section 8, Lightning 
protection systems, second edition, UNODA, 2015
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